COMMON QUIET: TOLERANCE AROUND 1688

BY COLIN JAGER

For every Church is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical.
—John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689)

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it seemed to many observers that religious uniformity was the only cure for England’s social and political turmoil. In 1558, the question for Queen Elizabeth I and her advisors “was not whether there should be one religion in England, but what that religion should be.” In the ensuing century the country would try out several religious identities, backed up with varying degrees of state power. And yet a trend remains visible: Henry VIII executed 51 heretics, while Mary dispatched 284; by contrast, during her long reign Elizabeth executed only 5 people for heresy; and after the Restoration, the disabilities introduced by Charles II did not aim at the reformation or correction of Nonconformist but at their political neutralization. As C. John Sommerville pithily phrases it, in a little more than one hundred years “England moved from the extermination of heresy to the harassment of nonconformity.” The conceptual shift from “heresy” to “nonconformity” is a profound one: it makes dissent a political rather than a theological category. The various government acts of the Restoration period thus made religion a concern of state power even as they tacitly acknowledged that national religious conformity was no longer a practicable goal in England. After the Restoration, England was a collection of consciousnesses (Nonconformist, Catholic, and Anglican) tenuously held together by a state apparatus forced willy-nilly to recognize their existence.

And so by 1733 we find Voltaire observing that “[i]f there were only one religion in England, there would be danger of despotism, if there were only two they would cut each other’s throats; but there are thirty, and they live in peace.” Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the Elizabethan demand for religious uniformity shares a good deal with Voltaire’s celebration of religious diversity. Both take for granted the modern idea that you can choose your religion. The difference is that in England before 1660, religious difference is externalized: England
exists in a religiously diverse world but—conceptually, at least—it is not itself a place of religious diversity: by the mid-eighteenth century, by contrast, religious difference has become internal to the nation itself, and even gets the credit for its increasing global and financial success.

“Toleration” is our usual name for this slow and bumpy process. To be sure, religious tolerance did not transform England instantly: its advent did not mean the immediate end of bloodshed, for the internal conflicts that surround the issue of tolerance—in France and Austria as well as England—were fraught and often violent. Nevertheless there is a clear and important shift from the international wars of the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries to the intranational conflicts thereafter.

TWO SHIPS

If we need a symbol of this localizing of religious dispute, and thus of the transition from absolutism to a modern arrangement of state power and religious diversity, we could do worse than imagine two ships that sailed from Holland to England toward the end of the 1680s. The first carried Prince William of Orange at the head of the biggest armada that Europe had yet seen: 463 vessels, 40,000 men and 4,000 horses sailed through the English Channel in November of 1688 and landed at Torbay. By the middle of December William was in London, and by the end of January he was King. That ship, full of statesmen and printing presses and backed by armies and weapons, brought the modern state to England. The second ship, a few months later, brought the Enlightenment: it carried the philosopher John Locke and the new Queen Mary.

For William and for the Dutch merchants who supported him, the invasion of England was a means to strike a blow at France and Louis XVI, whose policies threatened to destroy the Dutch overseas trading system. From a European perspective, the invasion was a delicate matter of trade, finance, and war, in which religious alliances were merely instrumental. On the one hand, William needed Protestant Hanoverian troops to guard the Dutch Republic’s eastern flank against a threatened invasion from France. On the other hand, he could not risk having his invasion of England interpreted as an attempt to save Protestantism from the predations of a Catholic English king, for the Dutch trading empire depended upon good relations with Catholic Austria and Spain. Most strikingly, this delicate situation issued in a Janus-faced foreign policy during the months leading up to the inva-
sion: William simultaneously assured English Anglicans that he was committed to a state church and would not tolerate Catholics (in other words, that he was fighting a religious war), and assured continental Europe that he was committed to Catholic toleration (in other words, that he was not fighting a religious war). Thus a Revolution widely interpreted inside England as a religious transformation appeared, from a European perspective, to be a matter of power and trade in which religion was simply an inconvenience.

In the event, toleration in England became official doctrine with the Toleration Act, issued in May of 1689. This was not a revolutionary document. Dissenting ministers still had to subscribe to some of the 39 Articles; all Dissenters had to swear loyalty to the King and deny transubstantiation; the civil disabilities established in the 1660s by the Test and Corporation Acts still applied to them. The Toleration Act did permit Dissenters to worship in their own meetinghouses, so long as they were registered and kept the doors unlocked. For the first time, something like half a million citizens had legal protection—though Catholics remained outside the protection of the law.

The Toleration Act was issued in the same month that England declared war on France. Gilbert Burnet, who preached William's coronation sermon and would shortly become Bishop of Salisbury, gave this account of William's thinking. The Toleration Act, wrote Burnet,

gave the King great content. He in his own opinion always thought, that Conscience was God's Province, and that it ought not be imposed on: and his experience in Holland made him look on Toleration, as one of the wisest measures of Government: He was much troubled to see so much ill humour spreading among the Clergy, and by their means over a great part of the Nation. He was so true to his Principle herein, that he restrained the heat of some, who were proposing severe Acts against Papists. He made them apprehend the advantage, which that would give the French, to alienate all the Papists of Europe from us; who from thence might hope to set on foot a new Catholick League, and make the War a quarrel of Religion; which might have very bad effects. 

Burnet begins with a familiar argument about freedom of conscience, but statecraft and diplomacy quickly come to the fore. Already prosecuting his own war with France, the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I had not recognized William's elevation to the kingship of England. William needed to assure Leopold that England's war with France was not a war against Catholics. So showing some restraint when it comes

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to Catholics is good for international relations and for international business: religious forbearance will keep things from becoming too religious. Toleration as England came to experience it is thus bound intimately to matters of statecraft. This is a good example of how the enterprise of secularism involves things other than religion, in particular how it entails the analytical separation of a nation (France) and a religion (Catholicism).

For some historians, toleration constitutes a tacit admission by the seventeenth-century state that it cannot police its own subjects. According to this argument, toleration comes from below, born of the desire to be free. In the absence of social coherence, religion becomes exclusive and intolerant; state-sanctioned toleration is the best solution, and the primary practical concern is how far such toleration can be stretched before national unity begins to fray. There is truth in this account—and yet to a great extent toleration is a tool of the modern nation state itself. More the creation of politicians and statesmen committed to stability, trade, and the management of populations than it was of theoreticians concerned with conceptual coherence, tolerance is not automatically the sign of an enlightened state, but it is a sign of a confident one. In a variety of ways, “heterodoxy served the public interest,” and Locke and others argued that it was thus in the interest of the state to protect that diversity. And so William, with one eye turned outward toward the networks of mutual hostility and mutual dependence that had been redrawing the map of Europe, felt secure enough to permit limited internal dissent. Power is therefore central to the development of modern toleration, both at its point of origin and in its continued maintenance. Toleration does not protect heterodoxy for its own sake, but for the greater good of the state; rather than a breakdown of social control, it is really a new form of social control.

Given these origins in raison d’état arguments, it is not surprising that toleration has never quite managed to realize its announced intentions. Statesmen are less bothered than philosophers by contradiction, and so it is no real wonder that religious tolerance would come to rest upon a larger intolerance—of Jews, Muslims, Catholics, freethinkers, or atheists. One or another group will fall outside the bounding line, wherever that line is drawn. What seems an irony is actually intrinsic to toleration’s logic: it creates minorities.
If William’s ship—and William’s armada—represents the internationalist view of a toleration driven chiefly by statecraft, then the second ship, the one carrying Queen Mary and John Locke, would largely shape how the events of 1688 and 1689 were understood within England. On the intellectual front, indeed, events were hardly less dramatic than on the political front. In 1687 Isaac Newton published the *Principia* and in 1690 Locke published the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. In between, England chased out one king, welcomed another, and remade the relationship of church and state.

When Locke turned his attention to the matter, toleration was a Hobbesian affair: a strictly political concern, a pragmatic concession on the part of an absolute ruler for the sake of peace, and hence limited to whatever a magistrate determined was most practical in a given situation. Locke’s own earlier writings had propounded a similar program. Yet by the 1680s Locke begins to formulate toleration as a theoretical program in its own right. This does not remove toleration from the domain of statecraft—but it does shift the relationship between the two, so that it comes to seem conceivable that toleration is an intrinsic good and thus a desirable goal irrespective of the larger aims of the state. Locke, that is to say, helps to articulate what would eventually be known as political liberalism: for him, individuals are bearers of rights (freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom to own property), and the role of the state is to foster and—up to a point—protect those rights.

Locke’s program begins with an anthropological postulate: because salvation is a personal matter, no human being can dictate its forms to another. The widespread acceptance of this principle in our own day makes it difficult to see what a decisive shift this was. To begin with, it attacks the prerogative of all those who might wish to preserve the alliance of church and state. It follows from Locke’s conception of tolerance that while there may only be one true religion, it is not necessarily to be found in the established church. This argument horrified the High Churchmen, for once the essence of religion was no longer bound to its institutional expression, it not only became impossible to legislate conformity; it also became possible to detach “religion” from political and social structures, and make it an object in its own right—in particular, a matter for each person to meditate upon in private: “the care of each man’s Soul, and of the things of Heaven,” as Locke put it, “is left entirely to every man’s self.” In the vision of the world laid out in the first *Letter Concerning Toleration*, the state cannot coerce...
religious belief, but neither can the church. The church is simply a voluntary collection of believers. It is on these grounds that “Lockean liberalism can afford to be gracious toward religious pluralism,” since pluralism is really its own creation.12

Some years later, when the Ministry considered repealing the Test Acts, Locke’s argument made its way into the very center of court life. In March of 1717, Benjamin Hoadly, made bishop of Bangor two years earlier under Whig patronage, preached a sermon before the King in support of repeal. Taking as his text John 18:36, “My Kingdom is not of this world,” Hoadley argued that the state should not get involved “in affairs of conscience and eternal salvation.” In Christ’s Kingdom “He himself is King,” the sole law-giver and judge in matters of conscience and of salvation, and he has “left behind Him, no visible, humane Authority; no Viceregents, who can be said properly to supply his Place; no Interpreters, upon whom his Subjects are absolutely to depend; no Judges over the Consciences or Religion of his People.”13 Having disentangled a largely invisible true religion from the visible state, Hoadly sounds a thoroughly Lockean note: “True Real Faith cannot be the effect of Force; and, if there can be no Reward where there is no Willing Choice: then, in all, or any of these Cases, to apply Force or Flattery, Worldly pleasure or pain; is to act contrary to the Interests of True Religion.”14 Without the claptrap of the visible church, the only things that matter for the believer are the sincerity of his intentions and the steadfastness of his will. These things cannot be coerced: they are invisible, private, immaterial.

Hoadly is careful to say that this principle has no bearing on temporal authority and its legitimacy; he is speaking only of the Kingdom of Christ. But this hardly satisfied his High Church opponents, who objected to the entire project of distinguishing between divine and temporal authority. Convocation declared that “the Lord Bishop of Bangor, hath given great and grievous Offence, by certain Doctrines and Positions” which would “subvert all Government and Discipline in the Church of Christ, . . . reduce his Kingdom to a State of Anarchy and Confusion; . . . [and] impugn and impeach the regal Supremacy . . . to enforce Obedience in Matters of Religion.”15 Hoadly’s response to this report ran to 342 printed pages, and involved various High Churchmen in a lengthy pamphlet war. Convocation won in the short term, since the government abandoned its plan to repeal the Test Acts. Yet for the Church of England to be drawn into a battle regarding the legitimacy of its temporal authority, played out in the press, means that such authority no longer goes without saying. The Church’s prerogative is

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now subject to public debate, and reasonable people disagree: that had been Locke’s point all along.

Hoadly’s adventures in the court of George I are a natural culmination of the processes that William set in motion as soon as he became king. He largely left the care of the Anglican Church to his wife, whose preferred inner circle included men of formidable learning and liberal inclination. John Locke, Gilbert Burnet (like Locke an exile living in Holland during the years of James II), and John Tillotson (the new Archbishop of Canterbury), together with Edward Stillingfleet, Samuel Clark, and Richard Bentley, made up the intellectual core of English latitudinarianism. Despite some important differences of opinion, their commitment to reason and their connections with Cambridge aligned them with the generally Newtonian sensibility that would come to dominate intellectual discussion in the early years of the eighteenth century. They shared a tone and a sensibility, one dedicated to intellectual and social moderation and comfortable and successful within the structures of Whig patronage.

Convinced that Enlightenment and Anglicanism were fellow travelers, these men found themselves in the right place at the right time, at the “conjunction of political crisis and intellectual revolution, buoyed up by the stimulating social atmosphere provided by swarms of refugees, pamphlet wars, coffee houses and clubs, and the international web of the republic of letters.” Reinforcing positions already established by the Royal Society, they aimed to preserve the civilized public against sectarianism and enthusiasm of all kinds, not only Catholic and absolutist “mystery” but also Puritan antinomianism and the rumblings of a Continental republicanism. Though there remained a radical Enlightenment culture (Deists, freethinkers, republicans) off to one side, the English Enlightenment was a more moderate affair than some of its Continental cousins. A broadly liberal consensus came to power with William, and after some back-and-forth, secured its hegemony following George’s ascension in 1714. Unlike those in other European nations, therefore, England’s progressive thinkers were establishment rather than oppositional figures. Accordingly, they made toleration a matter of state interest. The post-1688 Anglican Church and the philosophical Enlightenment were thus not merely intellectual fellow-travelers; there was a stronger, mutually reinforcing unity of purpose in their outlook, aims, and sensibilities.

We should not overestimate the influence of this group. Although a number of their protégés (Edward Fowler, Richard Kidder, and Hoadly himself) would go on to become bishops, in the short term
the conservative counter-Enlightenment forces (country Whigs, Tory literati, non-juring High Churchmen) retained the upper hand. They dominated Convocation, helped to defeat the Comprehension Act that was to have accompanied the Toleration Act, rejected William’s proposal to repeal the Test Act, and generally made life difficult for Tillotson and Burnet. Burnet in fact claimed that they drove Tillotson to an early grave. In the longer term, however, the latitudinarians would win out: Convocation was suspended indefinitely, and, after enjoying great success during Anne’s reign, the High Church party was defeated so soundly in 1714/1715 that they never fully recovered. Henceforth, and despite substantial resistance on the part of local clergy, what Roy Porter calls an “unshakeable commitment to the quadruple alliance of freedom, Protestantism, patriotism and prosperity” meant that the conservatives were playing by rules established by Whigs and latitudinarians. At the end of the century, when he revived the arguments for the importance of the connection between church and state, Edmund Burke appealed to the Glorious Revolution as an example of that connection. That modern conservatism should appeal to 1688 as an exercise in continuity suggests how thoroughly the Whigs won the day. It would have made a non-juring clergyman turn in his grave.

RELIGION AFTER 1688

Nationally, then, the Anglican Church after 1688 found itself deprived of its ground-level status. To be sure, religion remained central to the nation’s identity, but the increased attention to “religion” as an entity in itself indicates not the political strength of the Church but its developing weakness. Though they retained their traditional landed independence, the bishops increasingly found themselves split along party lines and involved in current political debates. Francis Atterbury, bishop of Rochester from 1713 to 1723, offers a case in point. A brilliant and combative speaker utterly committed to the preeminence of the church, Atterbury nonetheless in the aftermath of the 1715 Whig victory found himself drawn increasingly into a pamphlet war which, by appealing forthrightly to popular opinion and hence acknowledging that the hegemony of the Church had eroded, implicitly undermined the very principles for which he was arguing. (Atterbury was finally banished in 1723, and became minister to the Stuart court in exile.) All political partisans, from Tories like Atterbury to Whigs like Hoadly, addressed the question of religion with a self-consciousness indicative of its new legal and conceptual footing: “religion” had become...
an object of attention, of debate, and of knowledge. From now on, it was a “matter to be defined, limited, or encouraged—by powers of another character.”

Thus does the discourse of toleration make religion political in a new way—precisely by limiting its remit to the care of souls. In his sermon before the King in 1717, Hoadly begins by considering how the same word can mask different meanings: “The signification of a Word, well known and understood by Those who first made use of it, is very insensibly varied, by passing thro many Mouths, . . . till it often comes to stand for a Complication of Notions, as distant from the original Intension of it, nay, as contradictory to it, as Darkness is to Light.” From this general observation he proceeds to particularities: “For instance, Religion, in St. James’s Days, was Virtue and Integrity, as to our selves, and Charity and Beneficence to others; . . . By Degrees, it is come to signify, in most of the Countries throughout the whole World, the Performance of every thing almost, except Virtue and Charity.” This in turn leads Hoadly toward a crucial distinction between “Times, Places, Ceremonies, Imaginary Austerities, and all other Outward Circumstances,” which differ in every country, “diversified according to the various Humours of Men,” and the true essence of religion, which is internal and invisible. The historical and cultural trappings of religion are for Hoadly just that: “they cannot be the least part of [a man’s] Religion, properly so call’d, any more than his Food, or his Raiment, or any other Circumstance of his Life.”

In making this distinction between religion’s essence and its cultural “raiment,” Hoadly is simply carrying forward Locke’s claim in the first Letter Concerning Toleration that “I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the Business of Civil Government from that of Religion, and to settle the just Bounds that lie between the one and other.” And yet to separate religion from the state one must know exactly what religion is: toleration thus necessarily entails the thorny issue of defining the thing that it will tolerate. Here Hoadly’s own historicism leads to a kind of skepticism: he had begun by acknowledging that words do not mean the same thing from place to place, and so must end by claiming that even words cannot be trusted: when it comes to religion one must simply strip away all that is external: “what remains will be true, pure, and uncorrupted,” even if it is also, now, invisible. Most obviously, the Bangorian controversy turned on whether the church was a voluntary society “whose members had a God-given right of private judgment, to join it or leave it, and individually to assess the truth of its doctrines” or whether it was
a “corporate, visible, universal society” that demanded obedience. But this distinction was in turn mounted upon the felt need to define “religion” itself, and the feeling that at the end of the day it was more a state of mind than a set of behaviors.

The need to be explicit about “religion” affected not only the church’s political fate but also its internal sense of itself. Whig centrism altered the look and feel of religion in England. Thanks to the Toleration Act, the government licensed 2,536 meeting-houses in the years between 1691 and 1710. The Act also made it difficult for parish constables and churchwardens to enforce attendance, and the simple fact that on a given Sunday parishioners might choose to go to a different church—or, perhaps, not go to church at all—helped to drive home the fact of religious diversity at an everyday level. Anglican clergy now had to face, as never before, the reality of religious competition: they felt the need to persuade their congregants to attend, for they could no longer coerce them. Newly conscious of its audience, the church began to emphasize pastoral training, pastoral care, and the orthodoxy of the universities in new ways. As newspaper editors were discovering at about the same time, authority takes a different form once the concept of an audience begins to matter.

Historians of the period have described a noticeable uptick in lay piety and an “astonishing market for devotional literature,” much of it based upon the Book of Common Prayer. As the century progressed, the Methodist, Evangelical, and Sunday School movements absorbed and fostered much of this popular piety. And yet modern-day historians, like their eighteenth-century clerical counterparts, struggle to get an accurate picture of the religious landscape of the eighteenth century. They can track print runs and sales figures, perhaps, and to a certain extent the numbers of bodies in the pews. But how were those bodies spending their time away from church? And even in church, what were they thinking about? What did they believe? Such questions attain new visibility and new import in the aftermath of the Toleration Act. “Religion” takes on its distinctively modern character as something that people “have”—and thus what they might potentially lose. Defining it is hugely important, yet the new belief-based definitions turn upon internal states that are impossible to verify. And the only way to win and retain converts is through pastoral energy rather than more direct kinds of coercion. This gives rise to a different kind of religious expertise, what Mark Goldie calls “a new type of churchmanship which sought to seize the pastoral initiative” within a diversified religious landscape.
Despite its philosophical elaboration, the freedom of conscience celebrated by the elite Enlightenment figures I have been focusing on here was ironically enough a version of lay piety—a *religio laici*. An elaborate theology inevitably leads to divisions over esoteric points of doctrine. By contrast, “[w]hat we are now required to believe to obtain eternal life,” Locke writes in *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, “is plainly set down in the gospel.” We are to “believe . . . Jesus to be the Messiah,” and live “a good life.” Locke and his fellow-travelers aimed to strip away the inessentials and to arrive at a common core of sincere belief. Anything beyond that was the proper realm not of the religion but of the state.

It is perhaps no great surprise, then, that the most popular sermon of the eighteenth century was Tillotson’s “The Precepts of Christianity Not Grievous.” In it Tillotson argued that the sum of natural law was good behavior, moderation in all things, charity for fellow humans, and reverence for divinity. “And if we go over the Law of Christianity,” he argues, “we shall find that, excepting a very few particulars, they enjoin the very same things; only they have made our duty more clear and certain.” Tillotson’s target here is the Calvinist gulf between God’s commands and human capacity. By contrast, he argues that Christ “hath commanded us nothing in the Gospel . . . that is severe and against the grain of our nature.” Suffering for the Gospel is therefore a thing of the past: “the general sayings of our Savior and his Apostles concerning the persecuted state of Christians are to be limited, as doubtless they were intended, principally to those first times, and by no means to be equally extended to all Ages of the Church.” The easiness and contentment of contemporary Christianity, concluded Tillotson, is the fortuitous result of government regulation: “At first indeed whoever embrac’d the profession of Christianity did thereby expose themselves to all the sufferings which the power and malice of the world could inflict withal: But since the Kingdoms of the Earth became the Kingdoms of the Lord and of his Christ, . . . ’tis so far from being universally true that every Christian hath suffered the violence of persecution, that it hath been a rare case and happen’d only in some few ages, and to some persons.”

Reading this sermon, one might think that there was no such thing as a religious minority.

A LAYMAN’S RELIGION

Two poems by John Dryden written in the early 1680s complicate the consensus position represented by Tillotson, Locke, and their like-
minded compatriots. I turn to them in order to explore how Dryden’s literary art runs up against the limits of this consensus even before it had achieved hegemony. The heroic couplets of Religio Laici (1682) inhabit the very same intellectual terrain that Locke and Tillotson would claim in the 1690s: on the one side the dark meditations of Calvinism, on the other side a radical Enlightenment that as Locke put it makes “Christianity almost nothing.” In the poem itself and in its lengthy Preface, Dryden self-consciously positions himself between these extremes, along the middle way of the conservative Enlightenment that we have been following in this essay. The poem’s title suggests that he is responding to Lord Edward Herbert’s De Religione Laici (1645) and its argument for a universal religious impulse grounded in faculty psychology. Herbert is sometimes described as the father of Deism; his basically rationalist argument “That there is one Supreme God . . . [who] ought to be worshipped” dominated the Deist debates until Locke’s attack on innate ideas at the end of the 1680s. Dryden, for his part, thinks that Herbert’s presupposition of innate religious knowledge denies the role of revelation. Such knowledge is “not attainable by our discourse,” Dryden writes, “without the benefit of divine illumination.” Early Deist writers like Herbert and Charles Blount had made exactly this point, of course—for them, the status of revelation as a supplement to reason was just what made it suspect. Dryden accordingly shifts his ground a bit and focuses on the intellectual attitude that accompanies Deism. “How com’st thou,” he asks his imaginary interlocutor,

to see these truths so clear,
Which so obscure to heathens did appear?
Not Plato these, nor Aristotle found;
Nor he whose wisdom oracles renowned.
Hast thou a wit so deep, or so sublime,
Or canst thou lower dive, or higher climb?
Canst thou, by reason, more of Godhead know
Than Plutarch, Seneca, or Cicero?

Locke would offer this argument more systematically in the first book of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. There he has great fun listing all the nations and cultures he can think of where atheism is the order of the day, and he makes much too of the fact that “Men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconsistent Ideas” about God. For Locke, the empirical evidence simply does not support a widely-shared sense of divinity. But, he goes on, even if the idea of
God were universal, that would not prove it innate: “I doubt not, but if a Colony of young Children should be placed in an Island, where no Fire was, they would certainly neither have any Notion of such a thing, nor Name for it. . . . and perhaps too, their Apprehensions would be as far removed from any Name, or Notion of a God, till some one amongst them had imploied his Thoughts, to inquire into the Constitution and Causes of things, which would easily lead him to the Notion of a God.” It is reason that leads us “easily” to God.

Though he largely agrees with this approach, Dryden has less confidence in human reason, and worries more than Locke does about the historical presumption entailed by Deist faculty psychology. He is more willing to take refuge in ignorance: “We grant, ’tis true, that heaven from human sense / Has hid the secret paths of providence; / But boundless wisdom, boundless mercy may / Find e’en for those bewildered souls a way” (RL, 186–89). And it is at this point that another figure intrudes into the poem, through what Dryden in his notes self-consciously terms a “digression”: Richard Simon, a French Oratorian writer whose Critical History of the Old Testament had appeared in France in 1678 (English translation 1682).

Simon’s argument, soon to be repeated in the Critical History of the New Testament (English translation 1689), pursues a conservative, Counter-Reformation end through a most radical means. The original scriptural texts have been lost, Simon writes, and can be partially restored only through critical and historical work. Moreover, human hands have shaped the meaning of scripture from the very beginning: there are the inadvertent errors of copyists, for example, which are almost impossible to track down; there is the lag between event and recording, for instance in the first five books of the Bible, which could not have been written by Moses. And there is the very pronunciation of Hebrew itself: Simon explains that the diacritical marks that indicate pronunciation of Hebrew vowels were not added to the Biblical text until the seventh century. This is a crucial point, for the meaning of the words depends upon these marks, and so scripture as we know it cannot be entirely the word of God. “I am perswaded,” writes Simon, “[that] one cannot reade the Bible with profit if one be not first of all instructed in that which regards the Criticisme of the Text.”

Simon’s target is the Protestant priesthood of all believers, alone with their bibles and their God. Through negligence and the sheer passing of time the book in which the Protestants put such trust has been altered and corrupted; by radically destabilizing scripture, by detailing its complicated textual history, Simon aimed to strengthen
the Catholic Church. God’s providence has preserved pure doctrine, including all that is necessary for salvation, within the Church’s teachings and traditions, making the Church once again a divinely-sanctioned interpreter of a religious tradition suddenly less than clear.

Simon’s was a remarkable, and controversial, technique: its radical skepticism could be taken as proof of the importance of tradition, but it might also be ammunition for a freethinking critique of Christianity itself. Baruch Spinoza, indeed, had made similar textual and historical arguments about the unreliability of scripture. Simon worked hard to distinguish his work from Spinoza’s, but his books were nonetheless suppressed in France, and he was expelled by his order in 1678.

Dryden, more concerned with local English debates than with Continental ones, saw in Simon’s work an argument against Calvinist “fanaticism.” If Simon is right, then Protestant Nonconformists place too much faith in a source that turns out to be unreliable and corrupted. Dryden accordingly attacks “the Fanatics, or Schismatics, of the English Church,” “foulmouthed and scurrilous from their infancy,” who led the nation into “Rebellion, Civil War and Misery.” Though the poem begins as a response to Deism, then, and spends the first third answering various Deist arguments, its real target is a radical Protestant insistence that believers can immediately understand the truth of scripture. Yet this leaves Dryden in a tricky spot, since he is not willing to follow the compensatory move toward Church tradition. Simon’s skepticism, he thinks, is too corrosive: if scripture has been corrupted by human hands, why should we think the church has escaped worldly machinations? “[H]e that old Traditions cou’d subdue, / Cou’d not but find the weakness of the New” (RL, 256–57). This, he worries, is Simon’s “secret meaning” (RL, 252).

Having used Simon to fend off the Calvinists, then, Dryden turns not to Church tradition but to the position that, while some passages of scripture might indeed be obscure or corrupted, God’s providence has preserved everything needed. “[H]aving laid down, as my Foundation,” he writes in the Preface, “that the Scripture is a Rule; that in all things needful to Salvation, it is clear, sufficient, and ordain’d by God Almighty for that purpose, I have left my self no right to interpret obscure places, . . . because whatsoever is obscure is concluded not necessary to be known.” Like Locke and other members of the moderate Enlightenment, Dryden here views scripture as a packet of information about how to be saved: everything that must be known is clear, the rest is best ignored, and the individual is sovereign:
If others in the same glass better see,
’Tis for themselves they look, not me:
For my salvation must its doom receive
Not from what others, but what I believe.

(*RL*, 301–304)

Especially striking here is the bias against obscurity, the concern about words and their multiple meanings, that connects Dryden to Locke’s worry in book three of the *Essay* that people can make words mean different things, and to Hoadly’s concern a generation later with a similar malleability: “For the Case is plainly this,” Hoadly told the King, “that Words and Sounds have had such an Effect . . . upon the Minds of Men in thinking of them; that the very same Word . . . by having Multitudes of new consistent Ideas, in every Age, and every Year, added to it, becomes it self the greatest Hindrance to the true understanding of the Nature of the Thing first intended by it.”46 In Dryden’s case, this worry about the relationship between word and meaning leads to literalism:

The welcome News is in the Letter found;
The Carrier’s not Commission’d to expound.
It speaks it Self, and what it does contain,
In all things needful to be known, is plain.

(*RL*, 366–69)

Dryden distinguishes the “Letter” with its plain meaning not only from Calvinist passion (“Occasion’d by great Zeal, and little Thought” [*RL*, 416]) but also from a bookish, intellectual attitude that he finds everywhere he looks. From Simon he gets a critique of the “old Sophisticated Ware” of the Rabbinical tradition (*RL*, 237); but he criticizes Simon himself for writing “A Work so full with various Learning fraught, / So nicely pondered yet so strangely wrought” (*RL*, 244–45). The finer points of the Arian and Socinian controversies are likewise dismissed as irrelevant: “many have been sav’d, and many may, / Who never heard this Question brought in play” (*RL*, 319–20). Book-learning in general is best avoided: “The Danger’s much the same; on several Shelves / If others wreck us, or we wreck our selves” (*RL*, 425–26). Like Hoadly, Dryden thinks there is no reason to attach “new Ideas” to perfectly serviceable words.

*Religio Laici* is thus anti-intellectual and anti-literary; it aims to acknowledge but blunt the force of both Calvinism and Deism and to use Simon’s arguments without signing on to them. It is against a

*Colin Jager*
great many things, and in favor of hardly anything at all. In this task Dryden manages the heroic couplet to wonderful effect:

What then remains, but, waving each Extreme,
The Tides of Ignorance, and Pride to stem?
Neither so rich a Treasure to forgo;
Nor proudly seek beyond our pow’r to know.

(RL, 427–30)

The couplets holds open a blank space, a mean between extremes, neither this nor that. For a poem, and a poetic theory, resolutely suspicious of passion and obscurity, the balance of the lines creates a purely formal space: they acknowledge everything but avoid taking a substantive position themselves. In this sense Dryden’s lines are the literary equivalent of Locke’s vision of the church as a voluntary society, a true “religio laici” with no content beyond the individual members who assemble, disburse, and reassemble.

A KIND OF LAWGIVER

At the beginning of Political Liberalism, John Rawls writes that the liberalism he develops and defends is not itself a comprehensive doctrine. It is, rather, political in the strict sense that it begins with the assumption that there are in all contemporary societies “deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines,” and that the crucial question is not developing some supra-comprehensive doctrine that will place and organize them, but rather the much more practical question of how one might foster dispositions and frameworks that account for the irreducible pluralism of modern moral life: “The intention is not to replace those comprehensive views,” Rawls writes, “nor to give them a true foundation. Indeed, that intention would be delusional.”47

Something like this Rawlsian conception is what Locke has in mind when he shifts away from comprehensive moral doctrines and towards a new disposition regarding the fact of such doctrines. What the Deists with their faculty psychology proposed was a new comprehensive doctrine, a belief about belief; Locke’s aim in demolishing the philosophical foundations of Deism is to substitute for their comprehensive liberalism a specifically political liberalism without epistemological ambitions. There are many people in the world, and they believe many different and incompatible things; our task should not be to argue them out of
those beliefs nor to gather them into some meta-belief, but rather to
devise institutions for coping with them.48

Negotiating this same terrain in Religio Laici, Dryden seems torn
between the wish for a purely political liberalism and the desire to
fill in, however minimally, the blank space it tries to hold open. The
heroic couplet, with its carefully balanced antitheses, seems the
perfect vehicle for articulating an institutional space that is all form
and no content, all politics and no theology.49 Yet is a poem’s formal
brilliance strong enough to hold content entirely at bay? Sometimes
Dryden (and Locke, too) writes as if there really is such a thing as a
layman’s religion: muddle through, don’t disturb the peace, and don’t
worry about what you don’t understand. Thin stuff, to be sure, but
stuff nonetheless. Can there really be such a thing as a strictly politi-
cal solution? Can we really design institutions that don’t, somewhere
along the line, articulate their own comprehensive doctrines? Dryden
isn’t so sure.

This becomes clear in the closing sentences of the Preface to Religio
Laici, where Dryden remarks that in a poem that aims to instruct, the
poet is a “kind of lawgiver,” who ought to speak in a style “natural,
plain, and majestic.” By contrast, “[t]he Florid, Elevated and Figura-
tive way is for the Passions; for Love and Hatred, Fear and Anger,
are begotten in the Soul by shewing their Objects out of their true
proportion; either greater than the Life, or less.”50 This opposition
between plain and figurative language is an obsession of the moderate
Enlightenment. Dryden’s version of it matters because it aligns the
opposition with one he and Locke both think intrinsic to scripture
itself: if we don’t understand a passage, or its meaning is obscure, then
it is irrelevant to salvation, for God’s providence has ensured that all
that must be known can be easily known. Though Dryden does not
speculate about why God would arrange things in this complicated
fashion, the implication is that the obscure passages are those that
have been altered and corrupted by human hands à la Simon, while
the clear parts come straight from God.

When Dryden goes on to couch this distinction in terms of passion
and law, then, the labels begin to cohere: on the one side, obscurity,
figurative language, passion, and human influence; on the other,
clarity, plain language, law, and the divine. Law is the guarantor and
proper guardian of a saving knowledge; obscure language, meanwhile,
is strictly supererogatory. Not only does this render interpretation
superfluous; it also reveals how much the supposedly neutral space
between passionate extremes depends upon the force of law. Or, to
put it another way: the premise that the state requires protection from a “Florid” religion is itself a comprehensive doctrine: it is a doctrine of the state, and a theory about the intrinsic tendency of religion to lose its sense of proportion and propriety and interfere with the state’s business—business which includes, ironically enough, the “natural, plain” guarantee of salvation.

I am suggesting that Dryden glimpses something of the role of state power in creating and sustaining the largely empty spaces of tolerance. It is not merely historical coincidence that the discourse of toleration emerges alongside the modern state, for even the best-run institutions require law enforcement. This is obvious to anyone who thinks for a moment about the heroic couplet, a form governed by laws worn so lightly that, in the right hands, they seem to disappear. But it is apparently less obvious to those who try their hand at constructing a political liberalism that remains dispositionally neutral. Writing of the wars of religion, Rawls declares that these clashes eventually force “either mortal conflict moderated only by circumstance and exhaustion, or equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.” Yet in the majority of cases it is not simply a matter of removing barriers so that liberty may flourish. The reality has been messier and more ambiguous; what eighteenth-century writers called “civil society” mediates subjectivity and belief in a variety of ways, and the state, with the force of law on its side, gently or not so gently shapes the consciences of its subjects. As part of that shaping, it promotes a theory of religion centered on belief and salvation, and then informs its subjects which parts of that discursive object are essential and which inessential.

Though scholars have long called attention to the various intolerances upon which the discourse of tolerance is based, the usual approach is to criticize Lockean toleration for not being secular enough. Jonathan Israel, for example, remarks that “Locke’s is at bottom a theological notion of toleration.” And indeed, Locke is not willing to put all matters of conscience on the same footing. In some moods he extends limited tolerance to Catholics, Jews, and Muslims, but never to atheists. For Locke, writes Israel, “[s]aving one’s soul has priority over everything else and the properly ordered state must acknowledge that this theological requirement overrides all other considerations.” All humans have the right to work out their own way to salvation, but atheists have of their own will given up on the promise of salvation, and thus do not deserve state protection. Locke thus regards the fact of religious adherence as more important than the particular tradition to which one adheres. Jews may be going about their salvation in the
wrong way (and Locke thinks they are), but at least they are trying. This naturalizes not just religion but a particular construal of religion as the impulse to seek salvation, and it analytically detaches that impulse from particular expressions and traditions.

From one perspective, then, Lockean toleration might not appear secular enough. Yet its willingness to invoke legal power to institutionalize a particular formation of the citizen suggests that it is also, by the very same token, too secular. Toleration’s comprehensive doctrine, to put it in Rawlsian language, is really a doctrine of the state, and concerns the appropriate behavior of its citizens: “For points obscure are of small use to learn: / But Common quiet is Mankind’s concern” (RL, 449–50), as Religio Laici concludes. When Dryden invokes law as the way to restrain religious passion and promote quietude, he is making Isreal’s point from the opposite side. The “points obscure” condemned to irrelevance are both recondite doctrinal issues and the figurative and human language in which such issues might be couched. The imperfect separation from theology within the moderate Enlightenment means that a certain comprehensive doctrine remains in force under the auspices of the law, and this excludes not only atheists but a variety of religious minorities as well.

Dryden himself was to encounter the fact of state power during the 1680s. His 1685 conversion to Catholicism is well known to students of literary history, but the philosophical implications of that conversion are perhaps worthy of further thought. In particular, the conversion retrospectively makes the carefully balanced couplets of Religio Laici seem even more fragile than they already are. That poem eventually needed to invoke the law in order to define a space that consisted largely of a formal openness without much content. Conversion to Catholicism, by contrast, takes Dryden outside the law—even in the years of James II, more so after 1688. The “layman’s religion” had tried to empty out the space formerly filled with passion and disputation; without legal sanction patrolling the borders of that central emptiness, what will flow in?

“To the Pious Memory of the Accomplished Young Lady Mrs Anne Killigrew,” a poem written the year of Dryden’s conversion and published in 1686, suggests that the answer to this question is that very literary obscurity and loss of proportion that Dryden had described in Religio Laici as irrelevant to salvation. The linguistic theory under which Dryden had been obliged to work in the earlier poem had tied the plain and simple language of scripture to the plain and simple language of the verse, and lashed both to a project of salvation that was
supposedly humanity’s highest goal. By contrast, in the ode to Anne Killigrew it is the flexibility of the poetic line, the profusion of images, and the sheer worldly revelry in the very capacities of figuration—and indeed, obscurity—that demand attention.

In place of Religio Laici’s careful distinction between the visible and invisible church, the universe of “To the Pious Memory” is more participatory, even sacramental: in its closing vision, Anne Killigrew herself becomes a “Harbinger of Heav’n” who leads the “Sacred Poets” of the Hebrew Bible toward a specifically Christian redemption.55 In a way that will be worked out more thoroughly in later years by Robert Lowth and then J. G. Herder, the “spirit” of Hebrew poetry points forward toward Christianity.56 But in this case, it is Anne Killigrew herself—or more specifically her artistic and poetic skill—that substitutes for Christ and becomes “the Way” to heaven (“TPM,” 194). The orthodoxy of this move is questionable, but clearly the speaker is here giving voice to a rather different conception of the relationship between theology and the aesthetic than the one Religio Laici had offered just a few years earlier. Rather than getting in the way of religion, words are now its chief vehicle:

O Gracious God! How far have we
Prophan’d thy Heav’nly Gift of Poesy?
Made prostitute and profligate the Muse,
Debas’d to each obscene and impious use,
Whose Harmony was first ordain’d Above
For Tongues of Angels, and for Hymns of Love?
(“TPM,” 56–61)

Anne Kiligrew’s own pure poetry, says the speaker, will “atone” for this “Second Fall” (“TPM,” 67, 66), another instance of his willingness to see her in sacramental garb.

Remarkably, however, the poem spends more time on Anne’s skill as a visual artist than on her skill as a poet. We are only told in a general way that her verse is “unsoil’d” (“TPM,” 68) by the profligacy and debasement of the stage; her pictures, by contrast, get a fairly lengthy ekphrastic treatment notable chiefly for the nervousness they evoke in the speaker. In a witty conceit, he begins by describing the visual arts, which lie so near to poetry, as territory invaded by her ambition and rapidly subdued. But if the conceit implies that painting is conquered and absorbed into the realm of poetry, in actual fact the visual seems to escape poetry’s mentalistic frame altogether. “[O]ft the happy Draught surpass’d the Image in her Mind” (“TPM,” 107), the speaker reports,
and the result is a riot of subject matter, from pastoral to ruins to hagiographic portraits of the king and queen. Things get quite out of hand: “So strange a Concourse ne’re was seen before, / But when the peopl’d Ark the whole Creation bore” (“TPm,” 125–26). The speaker goes on to describe Anne’s various paintings as scene changes, recalling the very impieties of the Stage for which she was originally to atone. And he concludes that “What next she had design’d, Heaven only knows, / To such Immod’rate Growth her Conquest rose, / That Fate alone its Progress could oppose” (“TPm,” 146–48). At this point fate does intervene by killing her off (Anne Killigrew died of smallpox at the age of 25). To the speaker’s evident relief, death contains her and returns her to her pure form:

Now all those Charmes, that blooming Grace,
The well-proportion’d Shape, and beauteous Face,
Shall never more be seen by Mortal Eyes;
In Earth the much-lamented Virgin lies!

(“TPm,” 149–52)

Dryden may be a Catholic by this point, but his speaker here retains a Protestant suspicion of the eye. If the visual arts, with their immoderate growth and untoward juxtapositions, had seemed to escape the legislation of language, then Anne Killigrew’s own lovely shape and form, now safely tucked away in the earth, are ready to be reclaimed by words, reinserted into a tradition of “Sacred Poets” by the sound of the “golden Trump” (“TPM,” 178) that will blow on judgment day.

Recall the closing admonition of the “Preface” to Religio Laici: “The Florid, elevated and Figurative way is for the Passions; for love and Hatred, Fear and Anger, are begotten in the Soul by shewing their Objects out of their true proportion; either greater than the Life, or less; but Instruction is to be given by shewing them what they naturally are. A Man is to be cheated into Passion, but to be reason’d into Truth.” Florid, Elevated, and Figurative: “To the Pious Memory” is all of these, and though Dryden clearly relishes the literary space opened up by this (largely visual) mode, he apparently remains concerned about the loss of proportion this seems to entail. If anything, Anne Killigrew’s paintings play with perspectives and surfaces in the manner of baroque absolutism.

Dryden may be unprepared for the full-blown counter-Reformation aesthetic that Simon recommends and that Anne Killigrew seems to embody. At the same time, he is clearly unprepared to return to the simplistic form versus content distinction of Religio Laici. In its figu-
rative ebullience, “To the Pious Memory” suggests that toleration will not be able recognize the very thing it is supposed to be tolerating.

**SOMETHING AWKWARD**

Like secularism, tolerance is about many things other than religion. In contemporary usage it focuses less on belief and Locke’s cherished freedom of conscience than on questions of identity and cultural belonging. Accordingly it involves legitimation, the management of a population, the creation of a certain kind of citizen-subject, and a particular articulation of justice, peace, and civility—it is a form, in short, of what Michel Foucault called governmentality. In *Regulating Aversion* Wendy Brown suggests that contemporary tolerance discourse also has an aggressive side, particularly in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and especially with the ironic spectacle of Western-style tolerance going to war in order to defend its way of life. One link between tolerance as a mode of domestic governmentality and tolerance as a form of imperialism in fact comes by way of the secular: “certain cultures and religions are marked in advance as ineligible for tolerance,” writes Brown, “while others are so hegemonic as to not even register as cultures or religions.” The toleration debates around 1688 indicate that this is not a new development, though it has perhaps become (again) a deadlier one in the early years of the twenty-first century.

Questions of practical politics have always been central to the discourse of tolerance—and like Brown, I am less interested in being for or against tolerance than I am in tracing the various uses to which it has historically been put. Officially, the Lockean tradition aims to weaken the hold of substantive commitments by privatizing them. This aligns it with the tradition of procedural liberalism, according to which we should not seek basic agreement about the ends of life; the diversity of modern societies means we are held together simply by “a strong procedural commitment to treat people with equal respect.” Theoretically, such a society protects no one particular culture nor way of life but ensures equal respect for all; it understands dignity not as connected with a particular view of the good life but with the ability to choose for oneself what a good life entails. This model of liberalism construes difference very thinly; it applies rules uniformly and is suspicious of collective goals.

Yet part of toleration’s liberal goal has always been to reveal certain identities and commitments as “intolerant,” and to do this in political
service to a certain ideal of the state. Dryden’s poems suggest what theorists from Walter Benjamin to Jacques Derrida have tried to make clear: that even the most liberal laws are bound to violence, and that “common quiet” is a long way from peace. As an alternative, then, we might begin not with a culture-neutral premise but by acknowledging that a given society and its legal institutions do aim to nurture a particular culture, whatever their official claims. In defending what he calls the “politics of recognition,” Charles Taylor agrees with Rawls that cultural uniformity is impossible in modern life. Precisely because the majority’s sense of what makes for a good life isn’t universally shared, though, Taylor argues that multicultural liberalism is to be evaluated according to how well it treats the minorities in its midst. Here difference is construed more thickly: it inevitably involves substantive commitments, and moreover the state and its majority culture have a view about which substantive commitments are best. Though it actively seeks to create more citizens who share those commitments, the moral and ethical question is how it treats those who nevertheless don’t share them.

Yet the demand for recognition central to multiculturalism has its own difficulties. In an increasingly transnational era, there will be clashes between majority and minority cultures. Writing in the early 1990s, Taylor’s example is the Salman Rushdie affair; today, we could multiply instances, from immigration to torture to bilingual education to the politics of the veil. Even if a majority culture is good at explaining why a particular minority practice or tradition violates its core principles, there is still, Taylor writes, “something awkward about replying simply, ‘This is how we do things here.’”

Such awkwardness is precisely what has interested me in this essay. The cascading imagery of Dryden’s “To the Pious Memory” points to how the language program of Religio Laici screens from recognition a series of possible identities. But “To the Pious Memory” is hardly a celebration of a minoritarian identity. To the contrary, the speaker’s obvious relief at Anne’s death is an awkward attempt at finding just the right tone to strike in relation to an unruly and potentially infinite production of figurative difference. In the event, Fate steps in and restores some order, allowing the speaker to celebrate and sanctify Anne Killigrew without having to face the disruptive possibilities that her creative activities entail. Like Taylor’s awkwardness, Dryden’s awkwardness suggests that there is more to the issue than simply locating and protecting minority rights. “To the Pious Memory” gestures toward
a multicultural form of liberalism, but in doing so it both celebrates the possibility of minority expression and tries to manage its threat.

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NOTES


4 The relevant acts were the Corporation Act (1661), the Act of Uniformity (1662), the Conventicle Act (1663), the Five Mile Act (1665), and the Test Act (1673, extended 1678). In this, the Restoration government showed itself considerably more pragmatic than the Commonwealth that immediately preceded it. For that story, see Bruce Lenman, “The Limits of Godly Discipline in the Early Modern Period with Particular Reference to England and Scotland,” in Religion and Society in Early Modern Europe, 124–145, esp. 133.


7 Gilbert Burnet, From the Revolution to the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace at Utrecht, in the Reign of Queen Anne, To which is added, The Author’s Life, by the Editor, vol. 2, Bishop Burnet’s History of His Own Time, 2 vol. (London: Joseph Downing and Henry Woodfall, 1724–34), 2:12.


9 Michael McKeon, The Secret History of Domesticity: Public, Private, and the Division of Knowledge (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2006), 39; this account can be traced from Locke to contemporary arguments that Christianity thrives in the absence of state control. See also, Rodney Stark, The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success (New York: Random House, 2006).


11 Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 48.


14 Hoadly, 20.

15 A Report of the Committee of the Lower House of Convocation, Appointed to draw up a Representation To be laid before the Arch-Bishop and Bishops of the Province of Canterbury; Concerning several Dangerous Positions and Doctrines contained in the Bishop of Bangor’s Preventative, and his Sermon preach’d March 31, 1717 (London: John Morphew, 1717), 3–4.

16 Locke and Isaac Newton hardly saw eye to eye; and Edward Stillingfleet and Burnet were strongly influenced by the Cambridge neo-Platonism of the 1650s and 60s, and thus disliked Locke’s attack on innate ideas.


22 J. C. D. Clark has done much to recover the importance of religion during the period, but his account largely ignores the degree to which such reflexivity undermines the stability he argues for. See Clark, *English Society, 1660–1832: Religion, Ideology and Politics during the Ancien Régime*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000).


25 Hoadly, 3, 5, 6, 6.


27 Hoadly, 11.


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30 See Walsh and Taylor, 25.
33 See Porter, Enlightenment, 103. 
34 John Tillotson, “Sermon VI: The Precepts of Christianity not grievous,” in The Works of the Most Reverend Dr. John Tillotson, Late Lord Archbishop of Canterbury, containing Fifty four Sermons and Discourses, On Several Occasions. Together with The Rule of Faith. Being all that were Published by his Grace Himself. And now Collected into One Volume. (London: B. Aylmer and W. Rogers, 1696), 71, 71, 76, 76.
36 Locke, The Reasonableness of Christianity, 25.
41 Dryden remarks in the Preface that Religio Laici was written for the English translator of Simon’s book.
43 On Spinoza and Simon, see Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 446–53.
44 Dryden, Preface to Religio Laici, 224, 226, 226. Throughout his career Dryden could scarcely contain his contempt for Protestant Nonconformists, even after his own conversion to Catholicism placed him, like them, outside the protection of the law.
45 Dryden, Preface to Religio Laici, 222.
46 Hoadly, 4–5.
48 For the importance of this Lockean argument on later literary culture, see Mark Canuel, Religion, Toleration, and British Writing, 1790–1830 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002).
59 See Kenshur, 872 and following for an argument that Dryden uses Deism to transmute theological into political tension.
50 Dryden, Preface to Religio Laici, 227.
51 Rawls, xxvi.
52 In the aftermath of Jürgen Habermas’s argument in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, the rise of the coffeehouse has been seen as a model of the political public sphere more generally, hence structurally open and procedurally neutral. Their retrospective baptism as models for secular political discourse by philosophers like Rawls and Habermas indicates the strong genealogical ties between modern secularism and these earlier examples of it. Some recent accounts, though, emphasize that the sociability modeled by those spaces aimed to develop and sustain a model of Whig politeness whose very claim to non-partisanship masks its deeply political intentions. These more skeptical accounts reveal a common feature of the secular public sphere in general, in which the presumed openness of the liberal public sphere is in fact openness for some (that is, those who already share its preconceptions) but not for others. See Lawrence Klein, “Property and Politeness in the Early Eighteenth-Century Whig Moralist: The Case of the Spectator,” in Early Modern Conceptions of Property, ed. John Brewer and Susan Staves (New York: Routledge, 1995), 221–33; and Brian Cowan, “Mr. Spectator and the Coffeehouse Public Sphere,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 37, no. 3 (2004): 345–66.
54 See Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, 51; Dunn, “The Claim to Freedom of Conscience,” 181; Israel, “Spinoza, Locke, and the Enlightenment Battle for Toleration,” 104. Israel argues that only within the Spinoza-inspired radical Enlightenment does one find a model of tolerance in which freedom of conscience has been decoupled from salvation.
55 Dryden, “To the Pious memory of the accomplished young lady Mrs Anne Killigrew,” in The Major Works, lines 194, 188. Hereafter abbreviated “TPM” and cited parenthetically by line number.
57 Dryden, Preface to Religio Laici, 282.
58 In The Hind and the Panther (1687), Dryden would refer to Gilbert Burnet as a Buzzard, called “hawk’ by courtesy.” John Dryden, The Hind and the Panther: A Poem in Three Parts, 2nd ed. (London: Printed for Jacob Tonson, at the Judges Head in Chancery Lane, 1687), book 3, line 1123.
60 Brown, 7.
62 McClure, 365, 381.
Taylor makes the important point that neither form of liberalism is culturally neutral. Both are expressions of a particular culture—that of Latin Christendom. “Liberalism is not a possible meeting ground for all cultures,” Taylor writes. “[I]t is the political expression of one range of cultures.” He prefers the multicultural model in part because it is upfront about its partiality; procedural liberalism, by contrast, invokes a universalism achieved by screening out substantive commitments. Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, 62.