I began reading for this review aiming to seize the SEL opportunity, in customary fashion, to reflect on current trends in the field. I soon found it was easy enough to identify a recurrent theme. More difficult was the problem of sorting out whether this was a common feature of the books I was reading or a function of the interest I found myself bringing to them. I decided to adopt the Wordsworthian perspective on this conundrum: the recurrent theme is half created and half perceived. It can be summarized as the theme of the division of knowledge: not only ideas literary and otherwise—individual/society, masculine/feminine, objectivity/subjectivity, abstraction/concretion, arts/sciences, manual/mental labor, literature/nonliterature, aesthetic/didactic—but also issues of periodization: neoclassic/romantic, short/long eighteenth century, tradition/modernity, as well as the question of what a literary or cultural “revolution” entails. I’m not prepared to claim that problems in the division of knowledge preoccupy eighteenth-century studies these days any more than they did five or ten years ago. Once lodged in the mind, however, this way of formulating inquiry into literary historical change gives unparalleled access to some of the most fundamental concerns of the period field we have in common.

MONOGRAPHS

The greatest concerns raised by G. Gabrielle Starr’s ambitious book, Lyric Generations: Poetry and the Novel in the Long
Eighteenth Century, deeply inform its argument without ever being asked explicitly: How did society and the individual come to be divided from each other in the modern world, and how did eighteenth-century generic development contribute to this division? How did lyric come to mean poetry as such (as the novel came to mean all prose fiction) in the modern world? Starr’s explicit topic is the comprehensive history of genres: that is, not only the diachronic development of a single genre, but the synchronic interchange between genres at crucial moments in their chronology. Her test case is the relationship between lyric poetry and novelistic narrative in the eighteenth century. Now, since the novel was an emergent genre at the time, common sense might suggest that their interchange largely involved the influence of lyric on the novel. Starr’s central argument is that it was as much the emergent novel that taught lyric how to become most recognizably itself—that is, the romantic and postromantic lyric of modernity. Historical consensus sees the novel as different enough from traditional narrative genres such as romance to have earned a new name. However, consensus sees the history of lyric as terminologically speaking a broad continuity. Starr’s book makes us ponder the significance of the fact that the eighteenth-century development of lyric, at least partly under the influence of the novel, was radical enough to have justified a new term but was marked instead by the dilation of a traditional generic category into a kind of modal universality.

In skeletal form, Starr’s thesis runs something like this. Traditionally, “lyric” (ode, sonnet, elegy, pastoral, epithalamium, hymn, etc.) was first person, hence “personal” speech expressive of heightened emotion, whose concern to make the personal shareable made it “a site for creating emotional consensus” (p. 52). Developments in the eighteenth-century historical context aggravated the tension between individual emotion and the need to share it. This tension also preoccupied, in its own way, the emergent novel. The rise of the novel was owed in part to its susceptibility to lyricization. But the novel also learned the language of personal emotion from other generic sources, most of all the letter, which on the level of form explicitly highlighted the writer’s ambition to share individual feeling with another person. Coming as it were from the opposite direction, eighteenth-century lyric made an analogous adaptation in the first half of the century through the consolidation of the verse epistle as the favored poetic form. Lyric thereby “took on a strongly social character” and began “to include questions of the social validity of the personal”
(pp. 72, 75). But “[c]oncerns over how to make personal experience available—meaningful, affective, comprehensible, communicable—would find a different set of answers in novels than in poetry” (p. 13). On the one hand, the novel replaced epistolary form by methods that internalize the relation of the personal and the social, especially through a self-conscious “chiasmus” of “action and narration,” the fictional and the real, the what and the how, “mimesis” and “rhetoric,” content and form, characters/authors and readers, methods that find their technical apogee in free indirect discourse (pp. 106–12). By this means, the novel gained access to “subjectivity,” “a literary site of exchange, a way of crossing into the text” that signified and augmented the exchange between subject and object (p. 146). On the other hand, midcentury lyric replaced the epistolary model by affiliating itself with the theory of sympathy or sensibility, according to which the poet must “step outside the self” and “be presented as object, not subject” (p. 92). Only when poetry learned from both the practice and the popularity of the late-century novel to forego the displacement entailed in sympathy in order to pursue the subjectivity entailed in chiastic exchange did it develop methods “crucial to the mode of representing experience we now consistently call lyric” (p. 159).

This bald summary of Starr’s argument drastically reduces the specificity and subtlety of its local application; it also omits entirely a significant line of thought about the relevance of the domestic to the formal as well as to the substantive emergence of the novel. But selective summaries can throw into relief general problems that may be obscured by the lush growth of persuasive example and documentation. Starr rightly complicates the partiality of Ian Watt’s “formal realism” by pointing out how novelistic realism entails not only objective reference but also self-reference—although I think her account of this as a development by which “mimesis” is sophisticated by “chiasmus,” perhaps through Watt’s influence, obscures the degree to which the theory of mimesis possessed this doubleness from the outset. But it seems to me that Starr misreads the midcentury poets and theorists of sensibility as lacking that element of chiastic reflexivity that lyric therefore can only learn from novelistic practice late in the century. On the one hand, Adam Smith’s innovative premise is that the sympathetic “spectator,” so far from being dissolved within the suffering of the “person principally concerned,” must depend upon his/her own imagination to approximate, but never experience, that pain—hence the chiastic nature of the sympathetic exchange. On the
other hand, the relative absence of a fully embodied “I” in William Collins and Thomas Gray is no obstacle to chiastic reflexivity. By my understanding of the poem, at least, Starr overreads Collins’s “Ode to Evening” as a battle the weak and defective speaker loses to his subject matter. Rather, Collins’s poetry tends to focus on the imaginative process by which the speaker produces in the object an objective correlative that is already within him. In the “Ode to Fear” this is especially clear since the object of address is an internal emotion that the speaker chiastically recognizes to be a product of virtual (that is, theatrical/Aristotelian), not real, experience. In fact, Collins’s very preoccupation with the historical and cultural devolution of the power of poets to make us feel (as in “Fear,” and most insistently in the “Ode on the Popular Superstitions”) places the subjective capacity of the feeling poet at the center of experience, his seemingly passive longing to be influenced by poetry the key to his chiastic dominance of these poems. Perhaps the equation needs to be turned around. That is, the fact that unlike the modern novelization of narrative, the modern lyricization of poetry entailed no new generic terminology may have created the impression that lyric had to learn its reflexivity from the novel.

In any case, the argumentative discretion and balance of Lyric Generations are remarkable, especially for a first book. Also remarkable is Starr’s deep familiarity with, and fruitful use of, literary criticism written before 1980, which too often is treated as obsolescent and unequal to our newest formulations of what’s at stake in reading literature.

Ruth Perry’s new book, Novel Relations: The Transformation of Kinship in English Literature and Culture, 1748–1818, has a clear and deceptively simple thesis: “I will be arguing that the significant shift in the basis of kinship disclosed by the fiction of the period was a change in the definition of what constituted the primary kin group. It involved a movement from an axis of kinship based on consanguineal ties or blood lineage to an axis based on conjugal and affinal ties of the married couple. That is, the biologically given family into which one was born was gradually becoming secondary to the chosen family constructed by marriage” (p. 2). Much evidence for this “paradigm shift” is affective in nature: both novelistic characters and actual people show an increasingly strong sense of “loyalty,” “obligation,” and “belonging” to the conjugal family (pp. 2, 3, 25). Perry also uses an unusually wide and deep access to the anthropology of kinship systems to place eighteenth-century English culture in a
comparative context that supports this affective history. Perry’s presentation of the latter material manages to be both technically complex and lucid, and her treatment of later eighteenth-century discourse, especially novels both canonical and obscure, has a remarkable range of coverage.

Still, Perry’s antithesis of consanguineal “birth” and conjugal “choice” might suggest that she’s doing no more here than putting old wine (e.g., the decline of aristocratic ideology) into new bottles. Other changes with which she associates the shift in kinship system—the replacement of marriages of alliance by marriages of love (p. 121), “the transformation of England in the eighteenth-century from a status-based society to a class-based society and from a land-based agrarian economy to a cash-based market economy” (p. 29)—are also familiar. But if I understand Perry correctly, this is the point of her book. She makes no claim that the empirical reality of kinship change has a unique explanatory force. On the contrary, she is at pains to show its deep implication within a web of demographic, socioeconomic, political, and legal conditions that, although described here with a specificity that commands authority (another area of scholarship of which Perry shows an unpretentious mastery), she’s also willing to put in summary terms. In Novel Relations, “[t]he story is in the details,” but it is also (in C. B. Macpherson’s phrase) one of possessive individualism, “a story about how capitalism affected the family structure that existed in England at the time of the Restoration” (p. 4).

But if Novel Relations therefore does not tell us a brave new story, it does something more powerful because more persuasive. By telling the story of the coming of the modern from the perspective of kinship and family structure Perry defamiliarizes and historicizes what we think we know all too well. The pervasive conflict between marriages of alliance and marriages of love in eighteenth-century literature and culture, for example, isn’t simply about opposed motives for marriage. It’s also about the conflict between marriage itself and older ways of thinking about families that find their deepest meaning not in conjugal but in consanguineal relations (pp. 7, 147). By taking the broader perspective of comparative kinship systems, Perry is able to throw into relief especially those blood relationships between fathers and daughters, brothers and sisters, and children and aunts that are embedded in familiar courtship and marriage plots and that, once discerned, can transform our sense of what those novels are about—for example their endings, where marital closure so often
is accompanied by the (re-)discovery of blood relatives. From this perspective, the love match signifies not the triumph of personal choice over the impersonal materialism of the money match and family alliance, but the more sophisticated materialism of possessive individualism, which the institution of marriage had come to serve through legal innovations like the strict settlement and the disuse of partible inheritance practices (pp. 217, 220–1). And for this reason Perry argues that a better term than Lawrence Stone’s “companionate marriage” would be “privatized marriage”: that as “marriage became an increasingly important mechanism for the accumulation of wealth,” the “new form . . . of sexualized love . . . was needed to supply the place of earlier kin controls on sexuality” (pp. 193, 237). Indeed, the fact that we exist at the far end of this historical replacement process gives not only our general view of the family a “conjugal bias,” but even our reliance on demographic data, which derive from public records of marriages and offspring (p. 192). Reading eighteenth-century novels as “problem-solving scenarios,” Perry focuses on their “intense anxiety about family membership” and the way concrete details of conflict between the consanguineal and the conjugal models of family coherence represent social problems on the level of narrative content (pp. 13, 8). Within this range of focus, her interest lies less in “the way literature constructed or naturalized the new conjugal family” than in the way it stressed, in “nostalgic and compensatory” ways, what the new dispensation sacrificed in family solidarity, protection, and support—especially as the traditional status of woman as daughter, sister, wife, and mother was being reduced to a sexualization of the latter two roles (pp. 8, 13, 14).

As the less familiar phenomenon, Perry’s concentration on the novel’s indulgent attention to the world we have lost—to what she at one point calls “the cultural residual of consanguineal kin formations” (p. 9)—makes a great deal of sense. But it also risks the over-readjustment of a consanguineal bias. It seems to me that Perry’s attentiveness to the advantage of traditional over eighteenth- and nineteenth-century arrangements—hence to the historical plot of a fall from bilateral cognatic kinship to conjugal and affinal kinship—sometimes dulls her to the continuity of patriarchal domination that renders all such differences relative. Moreover, Perry’s insistent sensitivity to nostalgic and compensatory attitudes toward the disappearing consanguinary model obscures our broad picture of kinship relations by omitting ample evidence that the discourse of this period, novelistic and other, overflows with anger at and contempt for the injustice
of consanguineal principles. Perry liberally attends to seven or eight of Eliza Haywood’s narratives, for example, but not to ones such as *The Fair Hebrew* (1729), where the tyranny of patriarchal absolutism is enhanced by the putative brutality of Jewish Law, spectacularly represented in an interpolated story in which the father, enraged at his daughter’s impregnation by a libertine gentile, throws the newborn baby into a roaring fire. Reading Ann Radcliffe’s *The Italian* (1797), Perry sees the sympathetic and moving recognition scene between mother (Olivia) and daughter (Ellena) as evidence of the “triumph of consanguinity” even though the novel is more ostensibly a powerful attack on the corruption of consanguineal ties in the mirror institutions of aristocracy and Roman Catholicism (pp. 401, 458). Examples like these suggest that Perry’s fruitful thesis of kinship conflict is most persuasive as it adduces how often and explicitly eighteenth-century novelists obsessively invent such scenes in all their ideological variety rather than insisting on the ideological dominance of particular sorts of scenes or particular developmental patterns. But these queries are if anything a consequence of, and therefore a compliment to, the illumination that *Novel Relations* brings to its subject. It’s one of those books that, through a slight shift in the perspective from which questions are asked (as well as a great deal of careful scholarship), allows us to see the history of the early English novel in a very different light.

Just when it seemed that the old romantic historiography had been allowed to die a natural death, along comes Dror Wahrman to revive it with all the intelligence, ingenuity, and advanced technology at his disposal. In his preface Wahrman invokes Michel Foucault and summarizes in Foucauldian terms the argument he will make throughout *The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-Century England*: namely, that between the first three-quarters and the last quarter of the eighteenth century can be seen a sudden, rapid, indeed a radical discontinuity in English culture. (To be fair, Wahrman makes much fuller use of empirical evidence than Foucault’s followers, and some would say Foucault himself, tend to do. Indeed, this study abounds in arresting scholarly forays to which I won’t have space to do justice.) Wahrman’s principal interest is in “the making of the modern self,” by which he means “a very particular understanding of personal identity, one that presupposes an essential core of selfhood characterized by psychological depth, or interiority, which is the bedrock of unique, expressive individual identity” (p. xi). In summary form, the basic difference marked by this rupture is that
between ca. 1700 and ca. 1780 English people indulged a sense of self that was fluid and unstable: intermittent, unlocalizable, and unintegrated by virtue of being unanchored in the stability of an individual and essential interiority; and that all this changed around 1780 as a consequence of the English experience of the American Revolution. Before 1700, as well, there was a different sense of self than that which flourished for most of the eighteenth century—although Wahrman says little about what this was like, and when he does it sounds very much like his eighteenth-century paradigm (e.g., p. 335n72). This change in the sense of self Wahrman takes to be symptomatic of an even broader cultural revolution, in effect the making of modernity as such.

Now, it seems to me that the thesis of a fundamental shift in the West from “tradition” to “modernity” over the long term of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries is hard to dispute. However the thesis of this very substantial and closely argued book, that an epochal transformation suddenly occurred over the course of a decade or two at the very end of this period, is no more persuasive than it was in the hands of literary critics and historians fifty years ago. I can do no more here than suggest what seem to me the central methodological weaknesses in Wahrman’s argument.

How could such a thesis even be maintained? One way is by silently qualifying that thesis even as it is advanced. Another is through the partial selection of evidence. Historical (as distinguished from divine or natural) narrative depends for its coherence on the premise that continuity and discontinuity, however unequal in force they may be, work together and cannot be disentangled. And although Wahrman asserts the discontinuity thesis periodically throughout The Making of the Modern Self, he also qualifies it in a number of ways. The thesis is that there is a total absence of ideas of selfhood as essential, individualized, and interiorized before the last quarter of the century. But since this cannot be maintained with any consistency, Wahrman falls back to the position that we find such ideas expressed much less often, or with different degrees or kinds of emphasis or in a different tone of voice (e.g., pp. 57–8, 80). Sometimes the absence of one component of modern selfhood will be claimed as though it entailed the absence of the others (e.g., pp. 188 and 369n38). Sometimes the period of radical change, and even the period that follows it, will be acknowledged to entail the same antithetical usages that were said to define the difference between the “before” and “after” of ca. 1780, or that characterize the instability of 1700 to 1780
(e.g., pp. 251, 292). And sometimes the rupture thesis is complicated by the notion that “historical discontinuity . . . build[s] on pre-existing long-term processes.” Often enough Wahrman does this without explicit acknowledgment by using faulty metaphors that imply what in literal terms he denies—e.g., the figure of a “trickle” that becomes an “undercurrent” that “threaten[s] to come gushing forth.” Thus the American Revolution “crack[s] the dam, releasing and stimulating further the currents of unease . . . that had been slowly building up over the decades.” Thus (to alter the metaphor) a theory consistent with the idea of a stable self may be “available” for decades but “not really catch on” until much later. Indeed, the American Revolution, if in these formulations the last straw, also may be understood, with the French Terror, as antecedent “triggers—triggers that took different shapes within their own specific historical contexts—for a broader underlying historical process.” In fact it “was to take many more years” after 1800 before the modern sense of selfhood was to “triumph . . . The closing decades of the eighteenth century witnessed the beginnings of this historical change” (pp. 220, 212, 247, 289, 321, 117). But if all this is so, why the thesis of sudden historical discontinuity? When Lawrence Stone uses the “trigger” metaphor to describe the final phase in The Causes of the English Revolution (1972) it refers to the events of 1640–42 and is preceded by the revolution’s “precipitants” (1629–39) and “preconditions” (1529–1629); and despite the declared thesis of a sudden rupture, Wahrman’s figures suggest a very similar progression. The problem here is not the metaphors but the literal argument they ostensibly confirm: or rather, the way they import a plausible historiography that stealthily contradicts, even as it purports to sustain, the major thesis of The Making of the Modern Self.

How is Wahrman’s selection of evidence partial? To document this second criticism I will have to enter more deeply into his procedure. Suggesting that we may gain access to personal identity by investigating its component categories, he undertakes to outline how the radical discontinuity that is his subject can be observed in the way the categories of race, gender, and class change over the course of the eighteenth century. To this end he recounts the hypothesis, most closely associated with Thomas Laqueur’s study Making Sex (1990), of a shift from a traditional to a modern conception of “sex.” In the former conception, Laqueur argues, neither “sex” nor “gender” is conceived with the explicitness we attribute to them. Rather, biological sex is known to be implicated within, but not determinant of, the more general
category of (what we would call) gendered social behavior, which also implies social rank, legal standing, and other aspects of identity. In the latter conception, biological sex is separated out from this gender substratum and constituted as the natural and essential determinant of personal identity. “Sex” thereby provides the antithetical term against which the explicit idea of “gender” also is constituted. This modern idea of gender, which explicitly allows for a category of sexually relevant social behavior that is nonetheless not strictly determined by sex, is able to do so only because it shares the modern stage with the unprecedented authority of determinant bio-sexual being, by which the force of nature constrains the malleability of culture. In modernity but not before, the freedom of gender is therefore contingent on the necessity of sex.

It seems to me that Wahrman misconstrues this hypothesis. Thinking additively rather than dialectically, he sees the modern as coextensive with the traditional realm of gender, the only difference being that the strict determinacy of sex, now added to the equation, has the effect of making gender, by contrast, a “looser” category than it had been by virtue of now having an “autonomy . . . from the dictates of sex.” Wahrman is encouraged by this misconstruction to find in the early experimental interplay between ideas of sex and gender ca. 1700–80 “a space for play” cut off from both tradition and modernity, rather than, as Laqueur’s hypothesis suggests, the first stage in the modern accommodation of a naturalized and identitarian idea of sex (p. 43). And so this is what he finds.

Taking this misunderstanding of how to historicize gender as a model for class and race, Wahrman then asks: “[W]hat is to class as gender is to sex . . . ?” (p. 147). This kind of analogical question is an acute method of inquiry; but Wahrman applies it too literally, finding politics to be the missing term because like gender it constitutes a broader space for play over against an increasingly naturalized sense of class (pp. 147–8). But the traditional category that is precedent to class—what the modernity of class replaces as the determinant sex/gender system replaces the traditional, relative indeterminacy of gender—is analogous to the latter only in the sense of being precedent, not in the sense of being unnaturalized. That is, the obvious, empirically available answer to this question is what contemporaries variously called status, rank, and degree: namely, the traditional belief that social relations are natural because dependent on the hereditary possession or nonpossession of noble blood. In other words, the
respective “modernizations” of sexual and social categorization are not strictly analogous, as Wahrman assumes them to be; rather, in this important respect they go in opposite directions. Modern sex/gender as it were takes over from traditional social status the authority of the natural whereas modern class, and its accompanying idea of social categories as behavioral hence alterable rather than natural and fixed, takes over the relative fluidity of traditional gender. But Wahrman, unprepared for this complication, ignores the fundamental differences between status and class, conflating these usages whenever he encounters them. He assumes a continuous history of class categorization until the end of the eighteenth century, when all at once discontinuity sets in and “traditional” ideas of class suddenly become “fixed,” “totalizing, essentialized” (pp. 152, 153). This assumption accords with Wahrman’s schema, but not with the vast amount of evidence in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought and social practice of the emergence of a concept of class out of the experience of status inconsistency and social mobility. And it must be said that Wahrman also ignores, in the fields of both sexual and social categorization, all secondary work that goes against his own thesis. Abstract schemata, invaluable as aids to empirical discovery, become toxic when sustained in the absence of evidence.

I’ve said that Wahrman is partial in his selection of evidence; but it seems to me that he also misreads those pre-1780 articulations of individuality and interiority that he does engage, and instead of turning now to the category of race I’ll conclude with several examples of this sort of misreading. Protestant interiority Wahrman inscrutably dismisses as “solipsistic introspection” and “solipsistic judgments on oneself” (pp. 200, 369n40). The early novel he dismisses as concerned not with “depth,” the “original,” or the “individual” but strictly with characters as universal types. To maintain this position he ignores all counterevidence not only in the early novel itself but also in the early theory of the novel, instead taking the Theophrastan character, remarkably enough, to be the model for novelistic characterization before 1780. Moreover, Samuel Johnson’s carefully nuanced characterization of Imlac’s celebrated dogma (the poet “does not number the streaks of the tulip”) as one symptom of his developing “enthusiastic fit” Wahrman flattens into the earnest and normative opinion of Johnson himself (pp. 182, 183, 275). When the Earl of Shaftesbury, Smith, and James Boswell look within themselves and posit, in the interiority of the self, two distinct dimensions of selfhood, Wahrman inexplicably indict them of believing in the literality of that dis-
tinction and of failing to meet the standard of interiority because they attribute the constitution of the self to external forces (pp. 174, 187–9, 272). And when John Locke, before them, posits the interiority of sensation and reflection (the latter whereby “the Understanding turns inwards upon its self, reflects on its own Operations, and makes them the Object of its own Contemplation”), Wahrman bafflingly denies the coherence of interiority to this epistemology because (once again) the source of knowledge is ultimately external and the fruits of internal experiment do not shore up a stably self-identical view of the self (see pp. 189–92).

By standards like these Sigmund Freud is also innocent of the notion of interiority. Nor is it any part of Wahrman’s understanding that the very impulse to inquire into the nature of personal identity in the way that begins in earnest with Locke is itself the most evident sign that interiority has become an explicit postulate in English culture.

For Wahrman, any reference to the determinacy of the social automatically empties the language of interiority of its authenticity. I think it makes a good deal more sense to understand that the modern category of individual and interior selfhood emerges in dialectical relation with the category of collective and external society. In fact it is the dawning awareness that the determinant force of the external is not divine but human, not absolute and pre-ordained but contingent and social, that enables an awareness of the self as something that may be separated out from what need no longer be seen as the immutable cause of all effects, an enablement that works equally in the opposite direction. The eighteenth-century repudiation of the traditional determinants of identity as unreliable does not render the concept of identity itself unavailable because frangible, as Wahrman believes (e.g., p. 207). On the contrary, it begins the process of discovering those seemingly deeper, more personal, and therefore more authentic markers of identity—not aristocratic honor but virtuous character, not ascribed status but demonstrated merit—that show one to be what one truly is. True, eighteenth-century culture had a stronger sense than nineteenth-century culture of the dialectical relation between outer and inner, society and individuality. Later on, the notion of interiority became more vulnerable to reification, as though its existence was absolute and utterly indeterminate. But we need not reject this version of interiority as romantic idealism to see that the eighteenth-century labor to understand society and the self as a dialectical unit was continuous with the relative reification of the self after 1800.
In *The Gendering of Men, 1600–1750: The English Phallus*, Thomas A. King has made a major contribution to burgeoning scholarship on the emergence of gender and sexuality in late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England. This is the first in a two-volume project (the second volume will be subtitled *Queer Articulations*). Because its achievements are many and because its argument is tightly conceived and closely written, I will limit myself to what seems to me most important in King’s innovative work. This centers on his historicization of pederasty, in particular his understanding of its sociopolitical significance.

Like Wahrman but more securely, King grounds his analysis in (among other things) the thesis of an early modern shift to a biologically grounded conception of gender difference. But he combines this insight with another thesis, indebted to the work not of Laqueur but of Alan Bray and Randolph Trumbach, that this period also witnessed the emergence of modern notions of sexuality. The result is the doubly dialectical coalescence of, on the one hand, the modern norm of gender difference and the orthodoxy of different-sex relations and, on the other hand, the modern deviation of same-sex relations, the negative criterion of sameness by which the norm of gender difference was sustained. The suspicion that modern concepts not only of gender difference but also of sexuality were in formation at this time was spurred by the observation that, around the turn of the seventeenth century, sodomitical behavior was acquiring a new subcultural visibility, a notoriety as not just something that all men might do on occasion but as a mode of being in which some men might subsist as though by a perverse but natural dispensation. King breaks new ground, I believe, by insisting that we attend not simply to sodomy but also to pederasty, the specific form of same-sex relations that is dominant before the eighteenth century and that has a determinate sociopolitical meaning in that historical context. Pederasty names the species of same-sex behavior that requires between its participants a marked difference in generation, power, and status and that works, like the patron-client relationship, to cement hierarchical super- and subordination through the performance of one man’s (the prepubescent youth, but also the servant or the slave) dependence on another. From a modern perspective this is definitively a “sexual” behavior. Within early modern culture, however, pederasty was experienced as a political relationship of subjection that had for the submissive partner the positive status of a proximity to power that in turn bespoke power. “Courtiers, male and female, flaunted their subordination
as the mark of their favor. They displayed, proudly, their proximity to sovereign spectacle as the sign of their preferment” (p. 5). Like other rituals of subjection to the public body of monarchy, pederasty was a highly theatrical performance of abjection and self-display on the public stage of the Stuart Court.

In King’s argument, when we conceive pederasty in these terms we begin to understand the ideological meaning not only of pederasty in its eighteenth-century decline but also of gender and sexuality in their contemporaneous rise. The antithetical relationship between same-sex and different-sex behavior that is thrown into relief at this historical juncture bespeaks not a transhistorical “homophobia,” nor even simply the abstract logic of structural symmetry, but a political rebellion against the old order of hierarchical subjection. In the context of the far-flung political, social, and cultural conflicts that marked the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the critique of sodomy that is more precisely a critique of pederasty becomes intelligible as a repudiation of royal and aristocratic absolutism akin to more ostensible critiques such as the abolition of the House of Lords, the episcopal hierarchy, Star Chamber, feudal tenures, and the like. Over the long term, what replaced these institutions was the concept of a “civil society” that was separated out from (and thereby also constituted by) the public authority of the state and that ensured the freedom of private institutions—religious observance, economic exchange, the public sphere—from political subjection to the state. In an analogous fashion, different-sex behavior came to stand for a new order of “gender complementariness” (pp. 96, 128): not the forced penetration of pederasty acted out on the public stage but the voluntary social-as-conjugal contract; not the superficial and one-way gaze of spectacular publicity but the asymmetrical reciprocity of looks that constitutes the deep interiority of autonomous subjectivity and privacy.

Once we see pederasty as one among many analogous practices of the old regime, it becomes fruitful to entertain an analogy between the constitutive separation out of civil society from the state and that of “sexuality” from the traditional, all-inclusive category of political practice. As social contract theory posited the state of nature and the natural, rights-bearing individual as chronologically prior to and determinant of society and the political state, so contemporary “gender difference theory” separated out the gendered body as existentially and naturally—that is, anatomically and biologically—prior to whatever contrary political and social practices (like pederasty) might afterward be imposed upon
it: “This separating out of practices from ‘the body itself’ would naturalize the self within a body increasingly assumed to possess its distinctive properties, including its gender, prior to and free of any external manipulation” (p. 62). So in my view, King’s thesis offers a more persuasive view than Wahrman’s of “the making of the modern self.” Henceforth the naturalness of possessing inborn rights and sex will come to be seen as the primary determinant of personal identity, and this movement toward the interior—away from impositions “from without” and toward an indwelling authenticity—will facilitate a reconception of “the self” as defined not by one’s place in the sociopolitical hierarchy of subjection but by one’s singular subjectivity. By the same token, this idea of the self, fully separated out from all circumstantial contingencies, will provide the basis for generalization about what is universally characteristic of humanity. “Remembering” pederasty, King argues, is crucial because it is the missing term in the prehistory of modern masculinity, the sociopolitical practice whose theatrical display of dependence was inconsistent with the conception of an autonomous privacy that might be universalized as a natural condition of independence. To remember pederasty therefore is among other things to challenge this naturalizing conception, to imply that like pederasty, gender difference has a “political” contingency: “[E]arly modern opposition to aristocratic publicity has been naturalized and mystified as subjective desire . . . The privatized, social, subjective body depended upon the negation of the passionate, ‘natural,’ subjected body” (pp. 128, 149). So when King speaks of “residual pederasty” in the eighteenth century he refers to the self-conscious reproduction of pederastic modes of superficial publicity and self-display that defiantly theatricalized the aura of being subjected to another, a politics of “counterresistance” to the new order of privacy and deep subjectivity that was itself resistant to the old order of subjection.

King’s acute analysis of foppery as one such politics of counterresistance is itself worth the price of admission. More generally, the arresting implication of King’s argument is that the critique of same-sex by a standard of different-sex relations that surfaces in this period is plausibly read, at least through the eyes of many contemporaries, as a battle of liberation from arbitrary power. I take it to be a signal virtue of King’s work that the dispassionate discernment of his analysis leads him to an insight that ill accords with “our” understanding of where, in the modern discourse of gender and sexuality, the exercise of power is to be located. This very contradiction (but not rupture) between past and present
is the characteristic challenge of a rigorously impartial histori-
cization, and it forces us to sophisticate our understanding of
whether, and how, a line of continuity might yet be visible at a
deeper level.

Although King doesn’t make this particular application, we
might speculate that political absolutism was sexualized in the
eighteenth century not only around the figure of the willingly
subordinated pederast but also around that of the superordinate
absolutism of the “heterosexual” libertine. In this role the pen-
etrated pederast is transformed into the more sympathetic fi-
gure of the abject young woman who is seduced and abandoned—but
also sometimes married. Samuel Richardson’s Pamela might be
seen as the prototype of this transformation, which brings the
danger of absolutist subjection into the domestic household,
ostentatiously sustained there by the metaphorical language of
tyrant and slave, absolute monarch and virtuous subject threat-
ened with “heterosexual” penetration. In this way the sociopo-
litical critique of absolutism that first employed the language of
“sexuality” by focusing on the subjected pederast soon extended
that usage through the internalization of political conflict within
the domestic family. This internalization became a staple of the
domestic novel in the conflict between marriages of convenience
or lust (Daniel Defoe’s “money and the maidenhead”) and mar-
riages for love. But King’s argument founders, like Wahrman’s,
on the assumption of a simple analogy between modern sexual
and social categorization. That is, King periodically has recourse
to a familiar criticism of bourgeois ideology that only obscures the
historicity of his insight about the sociopolitical meaning of ped-
erasty. By this I mean his view that the “gendering of men, such
that a man might possess manly autonomy and authority regard-
less of the place he occupied, and of women, such that all women
could be defined as sharing certain innate qualities regardless of
rank or alliance . . . mystified the emergence of class differences
. . . [G]ender complementariness and conjugal sexuality were the
constitutive vehicles of the class body . . . To assume a natural
group of masculinity is to conceal actual differences among men
and to occlude the historical processes whereby differential male
embodiments have been produced and appropriated for the dis-
play of classed bodies” (pp. 12–13, 129).

A moment’s reflection will suggest why this view fails to ex-
plain the evidence. Like Wahrman at least in this respect, King
attributes to the emergent class system the same ideology of the
natural as that possessed by the emergent sex/gender system;
unlike Wahrman he argues that it is the influence of the latter
that is largely responsible for the naturalization of the former. But again, both the fact of class difference and the possibility of changing one’s class were fundamental to the class system, of which class consciousness and class conflict were constitutive components. The class system therefore was not susceptible to the naturalizing mystification of difference. On the contrary, it replaced such a system, which naturalized difference within the status group of the nobility by means of the homogenizing fiction of noble blood. Indeed, the residual status system of social relations shares the fiction of biological determinacy with the emergent sex-gender system. So far from being compatible in this respect, the ways of thinking about sex and class that coalesced in the eighteenth century were fundamentally at cross purposes, ideologically opposed to each other because broadly based in the antithetical convictions of, respectively, natural and cultural determinacy. And yet if this is so, the opposition between natural sex and cultural class also took some time to sink in. Richardson’s Pamela documents the delicacy of this cultural adjustment with remarkable sensitivity. Only after the common servant’s achievement of class mobility—a case of conjugal trumping consanguinal relations—has been energetically but inadequately obscured by her continuing subjection to her “master” does Richardson, through the humiliation of the aristocratic Lady Davers, fleetingly intimate that Pamela’s continuing subjection to her master is not a social but a sexual phenomenon, the effect not of her putatively naturalized status as a commoner (for she no longer is one) but of her natural status as a (married) woman.

My aim here is to argue against the sudden flight from historical specificity to theoretical hindsight that King’s periodic recourse seems to me to exemplify. Our twenty-first-century understanding of what capitalist ideology has become is so compelling that our efforts to learn its past can only with difficulty be kept from bleeding into our knowledge of its present. But the effort is mandatory for historicizing research, and we feel most acutely what is lost if the effort is foregone when confronted with scholarship such as King’s, that shines so clear a light into the obscure recesses of past culture. Despite my sense that it hobbles itself in the way I’ve described, The Gendering of Men is a richly nuanced and powerfully argued book that will repay the attention of all readers and that will play an important role in ongoing critical discourse in its field.

Why were the most cogent protofeminist women writers of the Restoration Royalists or Tories—that is, why did they not embrace the protoliberalism of the day? This well-known puzzle
is not central to Katharine Gillespie’s inquiry in *Domesticity and Dissent in the Seventeenth Century: English Women’s Writing and the Public Sphere*, but her study has a close bearing on it, as well as on the way modern feminists view liberalism’s legacy and present promise. Gillespie’s focus is the writings of several women sectarians of the Civil-War years, notably Katherine Chidley, Anna Trapnel, Elizabeth Poole, Anne Wentworth, and Mary Cary. Reading these women along with some of their male and better-known corregeligionists, Gillespie argues that mid-seventeenth-century English women anticipated major tenets of liberal thought, plausibly understanding them to be compatible with the interests of women. That is, they made use of the category of the autonomous subject, the individual abstractly disembodied and disembedded from contextual socialization. On this basis they wrote in favor of a political contractualism that both ceded individual rights to the state and guaranteed the right to dissent from and to replace the magistrate; they conceived themselves to be possessive individualists who had the right to own property in the wages they earned for their labor of preaching and prophesying; and they believed in the separation of the realms of the private and the public—the separation of church and state, the separation of home and state—as the institutional foundation of the free and sovereign self. As Gillespie shows at some length, these are liberal values that postmodern feminism has tended to see as masculinist ideology, for which it would substitute the notion that women—not only modern but also seventeenth-century sectarians—are especially representative of the “decentered self” and tend to champion communitarian rather than individualist social ethics. Gillespie counters that, often in explicit defense of women’s rights, “sectarian women writers actually forged the model of the subject that feminists actively seek to displace—that of the ‘sovereign’ or ‘abstract’ individual. Identifying them as early articulators rather than victims of this principle should challenge us to reconsider its status as a masculine construct invented solely to further rather than ameliorate patriarchal domination” (pp. 170–1).

Gillespie’s case is for the most part persuasively argued. And although she also has lesser fish to fry—the pre-Lockean emergence of liberal theory, the role of women in that emergence—her book will most challenge readers’ convictions that feminism and liberalism are incompatible modes of thought. Her case is interestingly complicated to the considerable extent that it depends on the derivation of secular from religious principles. Without alluding to
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it, Gillespie works within the tradition of scholarship (most notably that of Max Weber and R. H. Tawney) that has posited profound connections between early modern Protestant and secular individualism. This is because much of her evidence is drawn from writings in which liberal principles are enunciated in relation to spiritual not politicoeconomic states; often the spiritual will be accommodated by the figurative language of the political and the economic. Thus the universal subject (whether male or female) bypasses the mediations of the church hierarchy by entering into a “contract” with God; she renounces the father by turning to “the Father”; she labors in “God’s enclosure,” where the improving exercise of one’s own gifts is allowed, even encouraged. Is this really a secular—that is, a proto-liberal—sort of discourse? On the one hand, on a conceptual level it clearly pertains to another world; on the other hand, on a practical level it just as clearly addresses the way in which this one might be experienced. One sign of the separation of church and state is the practiced ease with which we learn to speak of one in terms of the other. Gillespie reminds us that the postmodern tendency is, with Louis Althusser, to see the Protestant calling as the paradigmatic case of an interpellation that mystifies subjection as the subject’s ecstatic choice. But since the postmodern tendency is also to see God and subjection to Him as a mystification, the process by which “calling” and “vocation” become dead metaphors in the modern world expresses the demystification of subjection as, on the contrary, what the subject freely chooses. The modern replacement of the mystified absolute determinacy of God by the real absolute determinacy of sociocultural circumstance only renames a determinism that has no interest in human agency. Gillespie’s study helps us see that not only feminism but also liberalism offers an alternative to such a vision.

Unfortunately Gillespie’s argument is hampered, especially in the introduction and first chapter, by stylistic problems. The most distracting and confusing of these is her habit of repeating primary quotations from mostly secondary sources without any clarifying reattribution so that it becomes difficult to tell who has said what, and in what context.

For the sake of concision one might say that Sharon Harrow’s aim in Adventures in Domesticity: Gender and Colonial Adulteration in Eighteenth-Century British Literature is to pursue the double meaning of the word “domestic.” Specifically, how does eighteenth-century literature represent the relationship between the values that inform the English home and the colonial values that are
Increasingly implicit in the British national project? Harrow sensibly questions the view that a proto-Victorian doctrine of separate spheres already ensured that home and adventure, private and public, personal and political, feminine and masculine were seen as mutually exclusive: on the contrary, “the domestic home and the domestic nation mutually implicated each other in the project of articulating a coherent British identity” (pp. 7, 29–30). Her central texts are Defoe’s novel *Captain Singleton* (1720), Richard Cumberland’s play *The West Indian* (1771), several late-century writings by women about travel, Jane Austen’s *Mansfield Park* (1814), and Mary Shelley’s *Frankenstein* (1818). Harrow’s developmental thesis posits a shift from early foreign adventures that “valued colonial difference” to late, domestically situated writings aimed at “assimilating difference rather than celebrating it” (pp. 99, 10). But Harrow doesn’t work very hard to sustain this generalization since her focus is on the later period and her broad argument is a good deal closer to assimilation than to celebration. Like much criticism of the past two decades, Harrow’s concern with the English home and the foreign colony centers on the metaphorical relations among languages of race, gender, class, subjectivity, nation, and geography. And like many recent critics she finds in this language use a justification for awarding semantic primacy to the colonial experience. That is, whenever the two arise together, domesticity is likely to be read as a “trope” for colonialism, a signifier for its signified (e.g., pp. 9, 42).

Occasionally this act of signification is straightforward and illuminating: that domestic narrative “dramatizes” the colonial, that “[w]e can read” the domestic “as a synecdoche for” the colonial suggests a signifying process that clarifies the truth of things (p. 7 and chap. 3 passim; p. 98). This may imply that, in the mode of Freud or Claude Lévi-Strauss, Harrow would have us see the signifying act as one that both “reveals” and “conceals.” Far more often, however, signification simply amounts to distraction or obfuscation: the domestic works to “temper,” “manage,” “incorporate,” “absorb,” “sentimentalize,” or “resolve anxiety” about the colonial (pp. 185, 17, 6, 9, 161, 77, 81–3, 100). This is because Harrow takes domesticity to be a trope of coherence, integrity, seamlessness, and “purity.” Colonial experience is the dark underbelly of domestic purity, constantly threatening to “adulterate” domesticity and therefore in constant need of domestic purification (pp. 77, 222). In Harrow’s view, the realm of the domestic—both the home and the nation—has for contemporaries a kind of pristine purity that is in danger of corruption (which often enough means simply
complication) only if it acknowledges the colonial and its contact with the other. This way of thinking takes us surprisingly close to the sort of separate-spheres dichotomy Harrow criticizes, which, as she acutely observes, “sometimes unwittingly perpetuated the same social divisions it was attempting to dismantle” (p. 30). And it suggests that England’s extracolonial domestic experience, not to mention English people’s experience of domesticity, was innocent of all otherness, mixture, hybridity, and the apprehension of adulteration, hence a breeding ground for that critical fiction, the “idea of a seamless and coherent Enlightenment subject” (p. 15). Of course Harrow knows this isn’t so—at times she’s eloquent on the parallel fears of international and intranational (e.g., status and gender) mixing—but in the interpretive construct that dominates her book domesticity must embody the illusory ideology that the reality of colonialism is defined against. It seems to me that this effectively allegorical mode of interpretation puts the cart before the horse, an impression that is strengthened by the fact that too many of Harrow’s readings find linguistic evidence of the “colonial” in passages of “domestic” narration where none can be seen to exist. In the chapter on Mansfield Park (“the use of female labor as symbol of moral value defines difference, [but] it also tempers anxiety about social mixing by assimilating difference into the narrative of domesticity” [p. 185]) it occurred to me that this method of reading precludes the insight that turn-of-the-century domestic narrative (and Austen is the great exemplar) finds the encounter with mixture, difference, and adulteration not in contaminating intrusions from without but within the realm of the domestic and its interiorized language of deep ethical motive. What if we see domesticity not simply as a cover or an excuse for something else but as a discourse that acknowledges otherness in its own terms and according to its own, delicately calibrated, techniques of internal analysis?

Harrow’s book is marred by the all-but-verbatim repetition of passages from the introduction in the various chapters to which they are relevant.

Colonizing Nature: The Tropics in British Arts and Letters, 1760–1820 is a searching effort to understand British colonialism and the arts of representing nature as parallel and mutually illuminating enterprises. The verbal and visual arts that are the object of Beth Fowkes Tobin’s study are georgic and pastoral poetry, travel writing, garden conversation pieces, family portraits in topographical settings, and botanical treatises, a variety of practices that were transported from their English uses to rep-
resent nature in the tropical and subtropical climes that English people colonized in the sixty years covered by her study. Central to Tobin’s concern is the way “these modes of representation constructed the tropics as simultaneously paradisaical and in need of British intervention and management” (p. 2). The demystification not only of the domestic but also of artistic representation through the disclosure of its colonialist ideology has become a familiar enterprise in literary criticism, and this aim is central to Tobin’s book as well. What makes it nonetheless more searching than many such exercises is her willingness to pursue the epistemological implications of this activity. At the heart of its ideological achievement, Tobin argues, is the way such art “abstracts” colonial nature from the particularity and contingency of its locale, “decontextualizing” and “disembedding” it from its human and cultural context, “aestheticizing” but also “naturalizing” nature in a process parallel to that by which commodification erases the specific quality of use value by transforming it into the general and quantitative medium of value in exchange (e.g., pp. 24, 26). Tobin knows that this ideological achievement is not simply the decontextualizing effect of transporting these artistic forms from the metropolitan center to the colonies but rather inheres in them as they were practiced first in reference to the English countryside, and she devotes much of her first chapter to documenting this fact in the georgics of Alexander Pope, John Gay, and James Thomson. Indeed, the lineage goes much further back, she observes, to Virgil’s *Georgics*, which, all about the locality of labor, still “splits” it into that of the “peasant-farmer” and that of the “poet-farmer,” who abstracts us from the immediacy of the soil by laboring in the “intellectual mastery of nature” (pp. 36–7). Tobin maintains that “[t]he competition between intellectual and physical labor for moral value is the central problematic of the georgic” (p. 52), and my only quarrel with this idea is its restriction to the georgic, since it applies also to the pastoral, whose contradictory ambition is to praise nature by artful means. At this point in our thinking, abstraction is not only the ideological weapon of British colonialists but also a fundamental problem of knowledge. To know something hitherto unknown is to understand it first of all not in its own “local” terms but in those with which we are familiar (p. 13). Knowledge is abstraction, an imperialistic act of appropriation and mastery. The paradox that the colonial paradise needed British intervention is at this level of abstraction the paradox of our Fall from Eden into knowledge.

Does Tobin’s abstraction of ideology to the level of epistemology undermine, even mystify, the truth of her study’s political critique?
I would say yes and no. Although this abstraction is nowhere Tobin’s explicit point, she gives us the means to do that work ourselves with the result that we are sensitized to the inevitably abstractive nature of all inquiry, including hers. The plausibility of Tobin’s account of how the English arts colonize nature depends to some extent on her selectivity, that is, on her having disembedded her chosen texts from a far more disparate ground. For example, Tobin’s concentration on Gay’s “Rural Sports” as exemplary of the way georgic tends to abstract its readers from agricultural work may be the result of too sharp a distinction between georgic and pastoral; in any case, Gay’s pastoral *Shepherd’s Week* represents rural labor with remarkable specificity and detail. Tobin refers to Mary Collier’s reply to Stephen Duck’s *The Thresher’s Labour* but not to Duck himself, whose trenchant anti-georgic places itself in the Virgilian tradition even as it takes the painfully concrete representation of rural labor as its central purpose. Nor does Tobin refer to other contributions to the eighteenth-century anti-pastoral movement such as George Crabbe’s *The Village*, which like Duck’s poem combines the close description of agrarian work with a self-conscious detachment from the genre it also exemplifies. My point is not only that Tobin’s knowledge, too, ineluctably depends on abstractive exclusions, nor only that eighteenth-century poets did not tarry for us but engaged in their own auto-demystification, but also that if abstraction is endemic to knowledge maybe it’s not so bad after all. I think it is a mistake to characterize, as Tobin does, “the Enlightenment redefinition of knowledge as abstract and universal rather than as culturally constructed and specific to a particular locale” (p. 32). The Enlightenment disembedding of abstraction from an undifferentiated epistemological ground was part and parcel of its disembedding of concrete knowledge from that same ground. The two categories are a dialectical unit: what the Enlightenment discovered was that knowledge is a process that works between the abstract and the concrete. Our choice is not between abstraction and concretion but between a way of knowing that oscillates between these dialectically related products of Enlightenment disembedding and the way of knowing that characterizes “traditional” cultures—like the ones penetrated by eighteenth-century British colonialism—in which knowledge is deeply embedded in a matrix of social practice. Abstractly speaking, this is an equal choice; but at the level of local existence it is supremely difficult to choose against one’s own cultural way of knowing.

We see the value of our post-Enlightenment way of knowing in Tobin’s own oscillation between her temporally and spatially local,
Anglo-colonial subject matter and the generic and epistemological horizons by which, she would have us see, it is circumscribed. The value of her critical labor—that it obliges attentive readers to go beyond the too-easy repudiation of colonialist abstraction and to locate our critique more firmly in the specificity of its politics and less so in the generality of its epistemology—depends on that oscillation. Why doesn’t Tobin make this method explicit? In a way she does. If there is a hero in *Colonizing Nature* it is Captain James Cook, who, she writes, was rare among his fellow voyagers in “acknowledging the labor, skill, and knowledge that Pacific Islanders employed when practicing tropical agriculture” but whom Tobin finds guilty of expunging, through revisions of his writings in its successive stages of log, journal, and printed history, his own local and contingent presence in what he writes about. “This quality of contingency in Cook’s apprehension of the unknown is nearly gone in the book version of the voyage, whereas in his journal he often makes the provisional nature of his knowledge explicit” (pp. 3, 165). By these signs of the “provisional” Tobin means those personal and circumstantial allusions to his own reporting that militate against the abstraction of his reports into disembodied “fact.” Tobin’s own report is framed by the provisionality of personal circumstance. Once she read Raymond Williams, Foucault, and their ilk she became “so overwhelmed by this recognition of the ideological implications of gardens that I was unable to take pleasure in planning and planting a garden in our backyard” (p. xi). Torn, like Gulliver, between her cultural way of knowing and her effort to renounce it, Tobin refuses to let her self-irony devolve into the requirement that she renounce that renunciation; hence this book—which nonetheless ends with another anecdote, this time of opening a catalog from Starbuck’s promising that through its products “[t]he whole world is in your hands”; and “[s]ince I love coffee and am a catalog ‘freak,’ I read with guilty pleasure” (p. 198). Through complicating interventions like these Tobin vindicates *Colonizing Nature* from the epistemological partiality she attributes to the Enlightenment and extends the way of knowing that the Enlightenment itself set in motion.

In *Reading the Body in the Eighteenth-Century Novel*, Juliet McMaster provides a lively introduction to the eighteenth-century prevalence of the idea that like a text, the human body was legible, a surface manifestation or signification of deeper meaning. Because she aims “to recover the reading experience of the contemporary readers of eighteenth-century novels,” she reads two kinds of text, “focusing on discourses on the expressive body that they knew very well, and following through the ways the novel-
ists made use of them” (p. xii). By “discourses” McMaster means something relatively substantive: ancient traditions of thought that treated the mind-body relation (like the theory of humors), modern medical theories and practices that both indulged and superseded those traditions, and especially the contemporary lore—physiognomy, pathognomy, the language of gesture—that sought to systematize and scientize the rules of body reading. McMaster consults many novels but devotes extended attention to Laurence Sterne’s *Tristram Shandy*, Richardson’s *Clarissa*, and Frances Burney’s *Camilla*. Her touch is light and her readings of passages from the novels are for the most part cogent.

Explicit in McMaster’s decision to analyze these two different sorts of text is the notion that the sensitivity of the early novel’s authors and readers to the potential and liabilities of body reading derived from non-novelistic discourses about it. No doubt this is in many cases a reasonable assumption, but it emphasizes reading the body as a matter of novelistic content more than form and thereby slights some of the distinctively literary innovations of novelistic narrative. Speaking of the skin as a “significant organ in eighteenth-century literature,” for example, McMaster construes its significance in terms of the “sexual excitement” its excessive whiteness engenders in Mrs. Slipslop and Tabitha Bramble (pp. 3–4). But Henry Fielding and Tobias Smollett are also parodying the topos of the family romance, by which the refined beauty of the outside betokens the virtue that goes with elevated birth. To parody the convention is to undermine the aristocratic ideology—birth equals worth—its naive version supports, and in the process to deny the trustworthiness of reading the body. By such means the novel declares its freedom from past practices—both the elitist politics and the tired conventionality of family romance.

Not that McMaster ignores the novelistic theme that trying to read the body may be treacherous; among other examples, she cites Lovelace’s ability to distance himself from his spontaneous emotions so as to fashion a misleading and deceitful face (pp. 111–2). But she doesn’t address the self-consciousness with which authors from Aphra Behn to Austen transform such thematic insights into formal technique by distancing us from the reading process through juxtaposing examples of the way represented speech, bodily appearance, and letters are read by other characters, as well as the way their own texts are read by us. Again, McMaster is aware of the analogy between characters reading and readers reading (e.g., p. xiii); but she doesn’t pursue this reflexive relationship—even in treating *Tristram Shandy*—as it becomes one of the signature features of the new genre. When
Silvia in Behn’s *Love-Letters* is duped by Brillijard’s forgery of a lewd letter from the honorable Octavio, she retaliates by setting up a tryst between Octavio and her maid, whose body she clothes and forges as her own. Only Behn’s growing expertise in third-person narration gives both characters like Silvia and readers like us the confidence to read beneath the objecthood of letters and bodies to the authentic subjectivity that lies within. Over a century later, Austen perfected a refinement of this technique of narrative disclosure. We know that Elizabeth Bennet is unable to read the pathognomic and gestural behavior of Darcy and Wickham at their first encounter because her narrator uses free indirect discourse to relieve us of the effort of reading her speech or bodily appearance by transporting us into her eloquent mind.

This sort of approach to reading the body in eighteenth-century novels would complement and enrich the more content-based approach McMaster employs. But she has done a service by bringing technical and popular thinking about body reading to the attention of modern readers, for whom (as she says) it otherwise may be broadly recognizable as one version of a universal human activity but largely obscure, perhaps illegible, in its period particularity.

Paul Goring’s concerns in *The Rhetoric of Sensibility in Eighteenth-Century Culture* are in many ways close to those of McMaster. His topic, too, is the legibility of the body, and he too combines the analysis of nonliterary discourses with that of novelistic narrative. But Goring explicitly limits himself to novels of sensibility (beginning with the prototype *Pamela*), and although he refers to the several sciences of body reading that flourish in the eighteenth century, he is more interested in arguing the proximity between novels and contemporary arts of performance as expounded by orators, elocutionists, rhetoricians, and theorists of acting. To these teachings Goring gives the collective name “elocutionary discourse,” “the general enterprise of eighteenth-century thinking and writing about bodies as expressive, eloquent objects.” And since these performance arts teach “that human bodies have textual potential and malleability,” the category of elocutionary discourse also includes “the reading of sentimental fiction” (pp. 5, 6). Perhaps because for him “the rhetoric of sensibility” is rooted in the tradition of classical rhetoric, more than McMaster Goring conceives elocutionary discourse as having a persuasive and a pedagogic purpose. Emphasizing the utility of Raymond Williams’s terminology, Goring suggests that in the eighteenth century “an emergent sentimental body image came to dominate over a residual
classical body image” (p. 13). This entailed “the emotionalization of oratory”—or, in more contemporary and physiological terms, a shift from a Cartesian and mechanistic view of the body to the understanding of it as an organism threaded by a nervous system (pp. 39, 130, 137). But the rhetorical roots of elocutionary discourse are evident in Goring’s sensitivity to the way it, too, would teach the paradoxical rhetoric of no rhetoric whereby through self-conscious discipline we may learn how to behave with an involuntary spontaneity. What the rhetoric of sensibility would teach, according to Goring, is “politeness,” a term whose popularity in recent writings on eighteenth-century culture has tended to blunt its point but that in Goring’s usage (and with the aid of Lawrence Klein) remains distinct and serviceable as an ideal of intersubjective social conduct self-consciously conceived as a formal practice (p. 22). “Politeness was in part a language that could be performed,” another term whose critical time has come that here plausibly takes in both the capacity of self-constitution that was truly emergent in our period and Goring’s sense that the rhetoric of sensibility was intimately bound up with arts of physical presence such as oratory and especially the theater (p. 23). But he also emphasizes that politeness had a moral dimension, and that the sensible body made legible the inner virtue of the person embodied: “The association of nervous delicacy with virtue endowed the demonstration of emotional susceptibility with the force of moral justification” (p. 24). Nor was the persuasive display of virtue as easy as this may make it sound, since at the “borders of politeness” lay the superficially similar and distinctly non-normative territory of enthusiasm, a territory Goring exemplifies through Orator Henley and Methodist religiosity (p. 63).

When he moves in his last chapter to the novel of sensibility Goring goes far toward justifying its status as an elocutionary discourse by showing how replete these texts are with the bodily performance of characters whose virtue is confirmed by the emotional response of other characters performing, themselves, the role of a surrogate “audience.” The reciprocal performance of this fictional audience or “reader” triangulates our own response as readers, moreover, helping us internalize the capacity for sensibility we read about. Goring suggests that it was the widespread fear that reading novels and romances would corrupt young readers that precipitated the ethical reflexivity of the novel of sensibility, and he makes the point that much of the focus of sensible reading was on readers’ sociable display of their affective response to each other. For this reason Goring argues that the familiar view of the
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novel as a “private” genre needs to acknowledge that “the business of reading . . . retained a type of publicness, and that there were strong public or social pressures upon readers to perform or advertize proper responses to novelistic literature” (p. 29).

The point is a good one; yet as it reminds us of that other and unprecedented sense of publicness that inheres in the emergence of what we have learned to call the public sphere it may suggest one problem in Goring’s emphasis on the proximity of the novel of sensibility to the dramatic art of face-to-face presence. True, the figure of the theater saturates the age. But in his plausible account of how often sensible “scenes” in these novels entail for us a theatrical “staging of somatic eloquence” Goring almost makes us forget that he is speaking metaphorically, that the bodies we encounter in reading novels are disembodied, that the sociability novels most importantly generate is not actual but virtual (p. 144). This does not make it any less “real,” nor am I suggesting that Goring obscures the difference between represented sociability and the sociability of representation. However, the brief but heady intoxication of the “cult” of sensibility may have lain precisely in the way the disembodied virtuality of its crucial medium allowed the imagination to float free of actual social practice into the domain of vicarious sociability. Fourteen years after Henry Mackenzie published the iconic text of that cult, The Man of Feeling, he speculated that in “the enthusiasm of sentiment there is much the same danger as in the enthusiasm of religion, of substituting certain impulses and feelings of what may be called a visionary kind, in the place of real practical duties” (The Lounger, 20, 18 June 1785).

This fine study has the added distinction of being written in prose that is a pleasure to read.

Charles A. Knight’s approach to his vast topic, The Literature of Satire, is disarmingly straightforward and conversational in tone, recalling the speculative nuance of Northrop Frye without the air of deductive assurance. His exemplary texts, broad in chronology and nationality, are primarily Latin, English, French, German, Russian, and American. A scholar of eighteenth-century British literature, Knight’s most extended dealings in this category are with The Last Instructions to a Painter, Gulliver’s Travels, The Dunciad, Roderick Random, and the journalism of Richard Steele; but his aim is not to give us a full reading of any text, and the range of eighteenth-century reference is expansive. Knight takes an unfailingly thoughtful position on all the familiar topoi of satire theory and criticism. He suggests that with the exception of its special relationship to the novel, satire is in general neither
a genre nor a mode but a “pre-genre,” “a mental position that needs to adopt a genre in order to express its ideas as representation . . . Its skeptical attitude towards life . . . makes it a frame of mind” (p. 4). Knight himself is skeptical about the way “sharp and stimulating definitions and distinctions” of satire tend to be “reductive and incomplete,” and he is “more concerned to uncover what satire does than to make authoritative statements about its essential nature” (p. 1).

By this Knight means several things. First, satire is less a product (or even a tool) than a process that “thrusts us into a communicative situation whose interactive nuances require us to behave in certain ways in order to understand” (p. 40). But second, the purpose of satire is “perception rather than changed behavior,” and although it may possess moral norms, “norms are not essential to satire, which may make judgments by internal shifts of perception that do not appeal to external values or by identifying the satiric object as ridiculous rather than immoral” (p. 5). We think of satire as an incitement to action, Knight says, because it makes powerful reference to real-world conditions in need of reform. But the yawning gap between this need and its likely fulfillment is a constitutive part of the satirist’s frame of mind, which it expresses by “shifting from specific political action to general political consciousness and by transposing the burden of frustration from the satirist to the reader” (p. 47). Third, Knight suggests that we replace the familiar critical concept of the satiric persona or mask with a “more flexible (and more historical) approach” through the concept of satiric “performance” (p. 9, and see chap. 4 passim). The idea of the satiric persona feeds the notion that there is a determinate solution to the problems raised by satire that can be found in the essential fixity and positivity of a moral norm that lies beneath the mask and is dependably separable from it. The idea of performance instead stresses the situational and contextual determinants of the satiric text and the inseparability of what it does from what it is. Satire, then, is “an open and exploratory form, designed to pose questions and raise problems, [and] suspicious of conventionally moralistic conclusions and those who pronounce them” (p. 14).

So Knight’s skepticism quietly questions some of the ruling postulates of the theory of satire: that it characteristically entails a speaker whose off-balance persona the reader is urged to rebalance or read through so as to discover the positive norms for reformatory action. His alternative view may be summarized (although these are not his terms) as the proposal that satire is best conceived less as rhetorical (persuading the reader toward
morally sanctioned behavior) than as *epistemological* (engaging the reader’s “understanding,” “perception,” “consciousness,” “frame of mind”). Broadly in line with this reconception Knight suggests that “ironic perspective on the historical subject and parodic borrowing of a literary form” “seem central qualities of the satiric frame of mind” (pp. 8, 6), and he organizes his study in two parts that reflect these two qualities. Within this organization Knight takes up the relationship between satire and other categories, some formal, some thematic: satire and parody, satire and the novel (here Knight profits from Mikhail Bakhtin without becoming Bakhtinian), satire and mimesis, satire and the press, satire and nationalism, satire and exile. Some of these relationships are familiar in the study of satire, some less so. No doubt the reader will dissent from some of Knight’s judgments—I wished the formal technique of parody had been distinguished more sharply from satire, and I wondered if Jonathan Swift’s masterpiece might better be seen as an exploration not of nations and nationalism but, more specifically, of the problem of how the citizen might serve the nation state. But Knight treats all of his topics with a degree of insight that confirms one’s sense that this thoughtful book is the issue of long experience with and careful reflection on its chosen subject matter.

Harold Love’s bold ambition in *English Clandestine Satire, 1660–1702* is nothing less than the disclosure of a hitherto unnamed genre. What he means by “clandestine satire” will be most familiar to readers as the kind of poetry that the Yale edition of *Poems on Affairs of State* collects in seven ample, but far from exhaustive, volumes. Love, who has done more than anyone to rescue “scribal publication” from the status of a seeming contradiction in terms, defines clandestine satire inclusively as the product of all three modes of cultural “publication”: that is, as “satire written for circulation through means other than the licensed press, which is to say by oral recitation, manuscript transcription, or surreptitious printing” (p. 7). This appears to put the emphasis more on the motive for than on the mode of publication. And in passing we might wonder (partly because of what Love himself has taught us about the cultural uses of scribal publication) if omission carries the same intentional weight as commission: that is, if abstinence from print can, like surreptitious print, be so confidently attributed to the secrecy motive. (On the other hand, Love’s usage occasionally contradicts his own proposition that print sometimes can be termed “clandestine”: see pp. 11, 103.)
The establishment of a genre is, for Love, not a deductive and taxonomic but a hermeneutic and historical project, and he devotes some space to describing the diverse conditions that contributed to the emergence of clandestine satire. “Lampoon” is the contemporary category he associates with the form, although “libel” is a close, if rather more general, synonym. It has both native (folk shaming rituals) and foreign (especially Roman) precedents, but its coalescence as a genre in the middle of the seventeenth century is an outgrowth of, among other things, the absolutist politics of the early Stuarts, the ill-advised policies of the later Stuarts (the Uniformity Act of 1662, the Second Anglo-Dutch War of 1665–67), and the Restoration tendency to see people “as material bodies engaged in a Hobbesian pursuit of material objects of desire, whether these are other bodies or such tangibles as money, land, white staffs, letters patent, and coronets” (p. 27). (Love applies to good effect the insight, counterintuitive to us moderns, that Restoration attacks on sexual misconduct commonly figured political critique: see pp. 51, 58–60, 245.) As contemporary and largely futile experiments with libel law suggest, clandestine satire was personal satire; but the kind of person principally concerned depended on the lampoon’s particular sociopolitical ambit. Love’s distinction between “court” and “Town” lampoon is partly chronological and generational, partly locational and audience-determined, and partly formal (e.g., evincing the formal effects of Cavalier lyric as opposed to verse epistles or prologues and epilogues). Love is especially interesting on the way “Town” lampoon developed in reaction to “court” lampoon not only in that it often attacked Court norms, but also because it was, more broadly, an effort to create “a new kind of urban civility” for “the regulation of the Town as a functioning society,” hence it provided “a kind of rough, vigilante justice” suited to the frontier ethos of a cultural norm still in formation (p. 91). Love’s third category of lampoon, state satire, has a different definitional character, one based not in actual location but in the interdependent features of a “public” theme and an audience expanded now to the national level. State satire “aspired to transcend the separate constituencies of Town, court, country, and City” (p. 100). Under this category Love suggestively invites us to see Andrew Marvell’s second and third advice to a painter poems (an attribution now gaining general acceptance) and his Last Instructions as “a single, progressive, satiric-comic epyllion in three books or ‘sittings’—his Caroliad” (p. 115).
Love can justify his selection of these three categories of clandestine satire at least in part by reference to the way contemporaries organized scribal anthologies (p. 141). But his more operative justification would have us see his three-part division as heuristic: “Our distinctions are simply a convenient means of giving manageable shape to a twenty-first-century discussion of the larger tradition” (p. 248). The decline of the state lampoon, and of lampoon in general, in the first decades of the eighteenth century Love attributes to the further development of urban culture in the direction of a civility, refinement, and politesse to which the outspokenness of polemic, however witty, was inappropriate. We might add to this a growing, transgeneric consensus—expressed in the stock preference of authors like Thomas Shadwell, William Congreve, Steele, Defoe, Pope, and Fielding for “satire” over “libel”—that impersonality and virtuality were ethically and aesthetically superior to personal attacks on actual people.

The argument I’ve summarized thus far accounts for less than half of Love’s energetic study. In its latter chapters he discusses issues of authorship (anonymity, the professional scribe, John Dryden as both author and frequent subject of lampoons); the proximity of lampoons and gossip; the transmission and reception of lampoons; and the formal “poetics” of the genre. Love’s commentary is various and some of his points are less pertinent than others. But the book is written in the spirit of an initial and exploratory enclosure of a field for future scholarly cultivation, by himself and others, and it ends in this spirit with a hundred-page “First-Line Index to Selected Anthologies of Clandestine Satire.” Love’s winning combination of imaginative critical synthesis and scholarly exactitude makes English Clandestine Satire a likely incitement to important new work for years to come.

Cindy McCreery describes The Satirical Gaze: Prints of Women in Late Eighteenth-Century England as “the first survey of a large and complex field. It does not intend to be comprehensive in its approach, but rather aims to sketch the major issues and themes involved in” her subject matter, whose raw material comes from the British Museum Collection of Political and Personal Satires supplemented by a number of American collections (p. 10). McCreery has in mind not only the common meaning of “satirical” but also its etymological derivation from the Latin satura, a mixture or medley. The prints she reproduces here are mixed in several senses: they cover a diverse range of social depiction, they often record the complexity and ambiguity of what they depict, and they comprise several different media: oil portraits, line engravings,
stipple engravings, etchings, mezzotints and mezzotint “drolls,” and the occasional woodcut. In her first chapter McCreery discusses these media, as well as the general scope, production, distribution, and consumption of prints on the London art market. The rest of her book is organized thematically, treating prints of prostitutes and market vendors, courtesans and actresses, literary ladies and “masculine politicians,” wives, mothers, and adulteresses, and women over thirty-five. McCreery’s discussion of the eighty-seven prints she reproduces and others she does not is mindful of the sociocultural types they represent, but also of the more complicated contexts of which they constitute simplified and momentary manifestations. Apart from her discussion of the London art market, McCreery’s commentary covers eighteenth-century English culture in terms that are not likely to surprise literary scholars. For us the value of her study lies more, perhaps, in the fact that she selects and annotates scenes that graphically complement literary texts of the period in interesting ways, and McCreery is herself broadly conversant with the literary analogues and influences. Satirical prints, she says, “seem to be a quintessentially English phenomenon,” and “[t]he last four decades of the eighteenth century are the so-called ‘golden age’ of English satirical prints” (pp. 6, 5). Along with some other recent publications (which she amply documents in her bibliography and footnotes), McCreery’s book will be a useful guide to the wealth of graphic representations available to those scholars of eighteenth-century culture whose primary concern has been with written ones.

_Hypocrisy and the Politics of Politeness: Manners and Morals from Locke to Austen_ is an engaging effort to describe variations in eighteenth-century approaches to social ethics in fictional and nonfiction prose discourse. Jenny Davidson’s point of entry into this thicket is the broad but flexible opposition between “hypocrisy” and “politeness,” where the former names the culpable disparity between the ostensible and the probative, what one says and what one does, and the latter a norm of social ethics that may vindicate, even propound, such disparity. The strength of Davidson’s argument lies in the range of variation on which she draws. In fact the book presents itself as first of all a study of hypocrisy as such, or at least of “fictional hypocrites,” and only then as possessing a period focus (pp. 1–2); and even within that more circumscribed terrain Davidson covers a lot of territory. Her first chapter treats “hypocrisy and the servant problem,” and her major texts are books on conduct and education by Swift, Bernard Mandeville, and Locke, with fruitful reference to
other writers. Chapters 2 and 3 take up not the servant but the woman problem as posed by the Earl of Chesterfield, David Hume, Edmund Burke, Mary Wollstonecraft, and William Godwin, with (again) pertinent and substantial forays into other authors. The parallel between servants and women, Davidson cogently argues, is that both are modes of dependence that mark the limits of a tendency to modify the critique of “hypocrisy” according to the liberalizing tenets of “politeness,” and that in this negative capacity both are structurally necessary to ensure the normative politeness of those on whom they depend (pp. 18, 45, 118, 131). Davidson’s final two chapters, extended readings of Richardson’s Pamela and Austen’s Mansfield Park, bear out this generalization even as they demonstrate the ability of the novel to raise difficult questions about the exclusion of servants and women from the relative liberality of politeness as a system of social ethics. By the end of the century, according to Davidson, the brazen defense of hypocrisy on politeness principles has subsided only because “hypocrisy” has been “redefined” as “modesty,” “self-control,” and “tact,” social virtues associated with the feminine and supportive of the notion that the disparity between what we say and what we do is the glue that holds society together and makes it civilized (pp. 2, 8, 106).

Davidson’s focus on social and sexual dependence as the place where the principles of politeness become problematic confirms our sense from other evidence that the point of strain in emergent social ethics is found at the nexus of commonness and femaleness. Moreover, her eye for nuance and ear for clear exposition are essential to the achievement of Hypocrisy and the Politics of Politeness. Problems that arise in the course of its argument, hard to separate from these achievements, take us back to the looseness with which Davidson defines her key terms at the outset. Because her interest lies not in the concept but in the word “hypocrisy” as contemporaries used it (p. 3), the working definition of hypocrisy as the disparity between saying and doing loses its utility on the very first page, where a number of other definitions are also offered—including “a discontinuity between motive and action,” which reverses the ethical significance of deeds by replacing ostensible “words” with probative “motives” (p. 1). In effect Davidson begins in medias res, in the terminological confusion that signals a fundamental shift in thinking; but this makes it very hard to appreciate just what the shift consists in since we have no sense of where it is coming from. Is conscious motive an essential ingredient of hypocrisy, as common usage
and Johnson’s definition—“dissimulation with regard to the moral or religious character”—would seem to suggest (p. 17)? Davidson cites Johnson’s definition, but she also cites ones that do not imply an intent to deceive, like situational role-playing, the repression of self-restraint, self-interested behavior, “manners,” “politeness” itself, and the protosociological insight, increasingly common over the course of the century, that assuming the appearance of virtue may conduce over time to its internalization much as habit becomes second nature (pp. 5–10).

True, Davidson can document many such usages in the writings of contemporaries. In aid of his maxim “private vices, public benefits,” for example, Mandeville claimed that “it is impossible we could be sociable Creatures without Hypocrisy” (p. 32). But Mandeville is using the familiar language of hypocrisy in a provocative and, even more important, an exploratory effort to propound a relationship between individuals and society that had not yet been described. In a work that extended Mandeville’s exploration, Smith wrote that “[i]t is the great fallacy of Dr. Mandeville’s book to represent every passion as wholly vicious, which is so in any degree and in any direction” (Theory of Moral Sentiments, VII, ii.4.12). When Davidson claimed that “despite obvious differences with regard to both rhetorical tactics and ethical ends,” doctrines of self-denial, self-regulation, and “Mandeville’s deadpan endorsement of hypocrisy as the lynchpin of sociability” are “homologous” (p. 33), I recognized that her book is less interested in hypocrisy than in the more general problem of the individual/society relation. Or rather, Hypocrisy and the Politics of Politeness is most interesting when the trite moral problem of hypocrisy is defamiliarized as not only an instance of the individual/society relation by virtue of presuming a relationship, but also an early instance of it still partially embedded in the paradigmatic sociality of Christian ethics. However, the reader has to do too much of this work of historicization; and in any case, Davidson’s book is not (like Mandeville’s) a socioethical exploration of new territory but a critical analysis of the old, and her representation of every effort to confront the growing individual/society divide as a more or less direct endorsement of hypocrisy is hard to understand. I doubt that hypocrisy was either confused with, or redefined as, those other categories by contemporaries. It seems more likely that it served an analogical and bridging purpose, and that one byproduct of this process was a reciprocally more precise sense of what it means to be hypocritical. And although his opponents may have found it brazenly hypocritical, I think the force of Burke’s
“defense of chivalry” on instrumental and pragmatic rather than essentialist grounds also needs to be understood, more deeply, for its contribution to the debate over the proper relation between social tradition and individual innovation (p. 81).

Davidson’s story is powerful and important, but it suffers, I think, from the way it gets told. For although she is interested in the process by which ideas developed in the eighteenth century, her narration has an oddly synchronic quality, and the strategy of trying to reproduce contemporary states of mind on the level of critical analysis gives her very little historical distance on her subject. Of the traditions within which hypocrisy was treated at the time Davidson rightly foregrounds that of the conduct book. But I was surprised that she says almost nothing about the tradition of casuistry, whose purpose was to narrativize, contextualize, and thereby adjudicate with greater sensitivity the range of ethical dilemmas that the blanket terminology of “hypocrisy” tends to conflate. If, as Davidson acutely remarks, “[b]y their very nature, conduct books tell readers how to act, not how to be” (p. 89), difficult cases of conscience were propounded to ensure that actions, because they were the outcome of conscientious choice, were also grounded in a normative way of being (p. 89). In a real sense it is casuistry, not conduct literature, that constitutes the pretradition of social ethics from which the protosocial sciences of Locke, Mandeville, Hume, and Smith are derived. If Davidson might do more to help us understand these diachronic implications of her material, her presentation of that material is itself an achievement.

John O’Brien’s *Harlequin Britain: Pantomime and Entertainment, 1690–1760* is a consistently intelligent and informative effort to provide for the marginal and traditionally berated form of eighteenth-century pantomime a major role in defining the transition to modernity in British culture. Not that O’Brien aims to resurrect pantomime on “aesthetic” grounds. Rather, he sees its enormous popularity as marking the moment when, in concert with contemporaneous social, political, and economic developments, the notion that culture may be (invoking the old Horatian maxim) *dulce* without also being *utile* enters into its modern acceptability, even normativity. O’Brien’s term for what is simply *dulce* is “entertainment.” “a new kind of public performance, one that challenged existing assumptions about the relationship between high and low cultures, the word and the body, the theater and society,” and that “was profoundly disturbing to those who wanted to preserve a monitory function
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for art” (pp. xix, 172). In an age of especially visual empiricism, pantomime took the materiality of the theater about as far as it could go, appealing to the pleasures of the senses by inverting Aristotle’s hierarchy of tragic elements so as to make spectacle paramount. O’Brien reminds us of pantomime’s rootedness in past forms, most of all commedia dell’arte, but he emphasizes its congruence with the British modernity of the public sphere and its “disturbing” embrace of the market and the quantitative, not qualitative, criterion of success. Indeed, the rise of pantomime in the eighteenth century is symptomatic of what “the English stage” in general shares with the public sphere, the market, even the aesthetic at this time, a disembedding from traditional thought and social practice that makes it “intelligible as an entity in itself, a domain of the culture that was separate from the royal court, the traditional pastimes associated with rural culture, or a continuous performance tradition linked to the classical period” (p. xxi). True, this coalescence of theater in its physical and bodily actuality would seem poles apart from the disembodiment and virtuality of the public sphere, and many critics have found the Habermasian concept to be antithetical to stage performance. But as O’Brien acutely argues, the public sphere has a hand in theater’s “separation” or “abstract[jion] out” because it is through public debates in print—most notoriously, the one instigated by Jeremy Collier—that “the English stage” gains its autonomy and explicitness (pp. 33, 48, 51).

The cultural ambiguity of eighteenth-century pantomime bespeaks the significance of its popularity. Because its ties to premodern ritual performance seemed patent, pantomime could appeal “to a desire to heal the wounds that modernity seemed to inflict on the social body by turning to the past to recover an original, authentic, and universal language of the human body” (p. 32). More often, no doubt, it represented the modern rise of, and fall into, “popular entertainment,” the debasing appeal to, and constitution of, an emergent mass public—although by “its first advocates” pantomime was seen “not as the sign of the stage’s decline, but as a harbinger of its reform and a vehicle for engaging the attention of spectators untutored in more traditional literary forms” (p. 87). Pantomime raised to reflexive self-consciousness the question of the spectator. O’Brien suggests that because it functioned as the “afterpiece” to a five-act play, the pantomime seemed positioned to “break the spell” (like the Restoration epilogue?) of the more serious and elevated performance it followed (p. 19). But because of the forceful immediacy of its spectacle,
largely unmediated by language, pantomime also was thought to be dangerously absorptive and to invite the confusion of representation with reality, a danger that included the mistaking of reality as "just another form of entertainment" (p. 171).

Needless to say, these are the central issues of modern cultural production, and O'Brien does a persuasive job of showing how deeply they are entailed in pantomime. Where he is sometimes less than persuasive, the problem involves attributing to the rise of pantomime too privileged and precedent a role. He tends to treat Restoration "neoclassicism" as the traditionalist antithesis of pantomime's innovations rather than as part of the same movement. Dryden was quite content to write and theorize tragicomedy; it is hard to imagine a parody of generic convention more self-consciously trenchant than the Duke of Buckingham's *The Rehearsal*; and English culture did not need to wait for Johnson to "put such neoclassical rules as the purity of genre and the unities to rest" (pp. 15, 18). O'Brien thinks it a "slip of the pen" when Joseph Addison, in treating how we respond to tragedy, refers to the "reader" rather than the "spectator" (pp. 84–5). That Addison means what he writes, however, is clear from those papers on the pleasures of the imagination (Nos. 416 and 418) where he pointedly refers not to seeing but to reading plays in theorizing aesthetic response as dependent on a degree of distance that is provided by the reading process but less so by theatrical spectatorship (an argument in which he is indebted, once again, to Dryden, and ultimately to Aristotle). But *Harlequin Britain* is far too rich to stand or fall on such evidence. O'Brien deals with much else besides what I have touched on here, and always with a delicacy of touch that ensures its pertinence to the topic at hand. This is a powerful addition to our understanding not only of British theatrical performance but also of how modern culture came into being.

At a certain point in her subtly argued book, Kevis Goodman, too, speaks of Addison's "slippage . . . inadvertent perhaps" from a focus on visual presentation in the *Spectator* papers on the pleasures of the imagination to one on verbal description (pp. 34–5). Goodman suggests this happens because in these papers Addison is drawing upon his earlier "Essay on the Georgics," where the object is explicitly and specifically literate. This is important for Goodman's larger argument, principally because *Georgic Modernity and British Romanticism: Poetry and the Mediation of History* is concerned to show the centrality of the georgic to the development of a distinctively modern sense of history in
the later eighteenth century. Goodman’s topic is not so much the genre, whose great popularity begins to wane at midcentury, as the georgic mode, whose influence suffuses much of poetry and culture thereafter (p. 10). Her book, well-couched in theoretical formulation, makes its case through extended readings of Thomson’s The Seasons, William Cowper’s The Task, and William Wordsworth’s The Excursion, and Virgil’s text remains throughout a crucial frame of reference. Goodman also draws interestingly on a broad range of commentators besides Addison, including Sir Francis Bacon, Robert Hooke, Dryden, Locke, Hume, Fielding, Johnson, and Crabbe.

Goodman’s book begins as a defense of eighteenth-century georgic against the critical charge that it abandons the form’s traditional interest in “history” by means of an ideological naturalization, a turning of history into nature (p. 4). Instead, she argues, georgic is instrumental in intimating a different sense of history that would avoid this obvious reification by avoiding the more stealthy reification in which normative modes of historicism consist. For georgic, history is not a rational result or product, a set of ideas about an objectively delimited past, but a process, an inchoate fluidity of feelings that precedes ideation and preserves, in the present moment of poetic production, the mediating space between subject and object, material sensation and materialized discourse. Deftly sidestepping the charge of naive experientialism that this avoidance of naive empiricism generates, Goodman sees georgic as an act of mediation that is uncommonly self-conscious about that very activity. Although it has been called “realistic,” in fact georgic’s pedagogic attention to “nature” and its “real” husbandry is maintained in language that draws attention to the pedagogic process of transmission through its own imaginative artificiality, creating a mode of reflexivity that is grounded in Virgil’s own prototypical practice: “these books are as much about the tending of words as they are about agriculture and other forms of terraculture” (pp. 9, 11). Poetic technique is not (only) a metonymic medium by which to gain access to agricultural technology but also a metaphorical version of it, not reference but self-reference, an artful line parallel to a nature it will never meet. For this reason “history” is an effect/affect not simply of mediation but of its failure, the still-sensible “hurt” or “unpleasurable feeling” that comes with the recognition that all efforts at producing the pleasure of a successful mediation fall short of the mark and that is evident in the modern tendency to conflate “the elegiac” and “the melancholic” with “the historiographical” (pp. 3–4, 112).
Goodman finds eighteenth-century georgic to be in self-conscious competition with rival media, “test[ing] its mediating power” in a “clash between rival mediations of the social field” for which, as for georgic, improved methods of mediation emphasize both its unachievability and its affective existence beyond “both ‘idea’ and direct articulation.” The rivals that Goodman is especially interested in—“optical technology” like the microscope, “oral interchange” like conversation and storytelling, print forms like the newspaper— are analogous to georgic in being “prostheses,” “artificial organs’ of perception and communication” (pp. 8, 9, 12, 71).

I think Goodman is on to something important here, but I’m not persuaded that it has to do with either georgic or history in particular. It seems to me that the modern problem of mediation, perhaps a “secularization” of the Christian problem of accommodation, is coextensive with the expansive domain of epistemology as such, of which historiography is one important component. This seems clear enough in the case of scientific mediation but also in that of georgic mediation, in both of which the problem of knowledge is not that of knowing history but, more fundamentally, that of the relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge. (If by “history” what Goodman means is just this—i.e., nothing less than “objectivity,” all that lies beyond the knowing subject—then her usage does her meaning ill service.) Once formulated at this level of abstraction, the problem of mediation can be seen to saturate eighteenth-century culture in a full spectrum of concrete versions and instances. (The greatest casualty of bracketing this range is pastoral, which Goodman treats as the fatuous mirror image, “pasteurized of its historicity,” of georgic’s noble mission [p. 59].) One offshoot of contemporary efforts to grapple with this problem was the division between the arts and the sciences, which, despite early fears that technological prostheses and the artificiality of “experiment” only obscured nature (on which see Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump), seemed to have very different mediatory success rates. And one offshot of this division was, in turn, the formulation of the modern idea of the aesthetic, which, like science, was grounded in empirical sensation but, unlike science, made a doctrinal virtue of its distance from the senses and of its reflexive resistance to the immediacy of object to subject by making the subject one object of representation. This is where Addison’s pleasures of the imagination might become important in Goodman’s argument, I think, because for him the imagination is precisely
that faculty of mediation which, detached both from the senses and from the understanding, succeeds in producing pleasure precisely because it fails to achieve an actual mediation—that is, because its mediation is virtual. Having elevated representational or secondary over primary pleasures of the imagination owing to their greater distance from sense perception, Addison pursues this logic within the category of secondary pleasures by elevating reading over viewing.

Goodman’s historicizing instincts are strong. She argues against the presentism of treating “the media” and their problems as peculiar to our own age, of indicting the early natural philosophers of the naive belief that words can offer immediate signs of things, and of seeing Enlightenment thought as committed to the split between subject and object (see pp. 15, 26, 49–50). This being the case, it seems to me that Georgic Modernity and British Romanticism limits the force of its considerable intelligence by limiting its attention as it does—that is, by treating the georgic mode and historical knowledge as singular rather than as exemplary of a greater phenomenon.

Fred Parker’s Scepticism and Literature: An Essay on Pope, Hume, Sterne, and Johnson manages to combine the often-opposed virtues of conceptual precision and readability, and in this respect it resembles its topic, which is not philosophical skepticism as such but literary texts that are skeptical. What Parker calls “sceptical thinking” involves “a certain doubleness of stance. It is a practice, or a process, not an intellectual position, and where it advances positions it does so with a certain playfulness or irony, with a consciousness of their necessary provisionality or contingency: as if opening a dialogue” (pp. 2–3). This “tension or doubleness” entails “a power of affirmation that emerges from, without denying or transcending, the inadequacy of intellect to master the fluidity and variousness of things” (p. 232). Parker believes that the doubleness of skeptical thinking is often achieved most effectively in literature, and this is true because in literature “words mean more than they say,” and the ironic or dialogic quality of skeptical thinking is echoed and reinforced by the interplay between the what and the how of literature, between its apparently propositional content and its plasticity of form and style (p. 3). Scepticism and Literature is about this interplay as it occurs in texts by the four authors named in its subtitle, but it also has a chapter on Locke that, less attentive to style than is the chapter on Hume, establishes how skeptical thinking achieves its characteristic doubleness in more or less
strictly conceptual terms. Parker supplements these readings by treating a number of other celebrated skeptics of the Renaissance and eighteenth century, among them Pierre Bayle, Swift, and Michel de Montaigne, and the guiding presence of the last of these is felt throughout the study.

The tension that lies at the heart of skeptical thinking Parker formulates in different ways for different authors. Pope’s skepticism in the Essay on Man runs on the engine of philosophy-as-poetry; Hume moves between radical skepticism and experience, or common sense, or the sociable style; Johnson’s principled moralism is leavened by the irony that escapes around the edges of his ponderous style and syntax. Specialists in eighteenth-century literature will be informed most by the stylistic delicacy with which Parker distinguishes each of these figures from one another. My only regret is that because his focus on eighteenth-century texts is historical in the synchronic but not the diachronic sense of the term, the sustained doubleness that is his subject is analyzed as a philosophical-literary rather than as a period phenomenon. Parker gives us the best rationale I have read for why Pope’s Essay on Man is a successful poem, and yet I can’t help wondering if its oddity owes in part to the fact that the disciplinary divisions between the business of literature and that of philosophy, so evident to us now, were only emergent in the eighteenth century. Does “sceptical thinking” flourish most luxuriantly in cultures in which the division of knowledge is developing but not yet (over)developed?

In his introduction to The Symbolic Design of “Windsor-Forest”: Iconography, Pageant, and Prophecy in Pope’s Early Work, Pat Rogers tells us that this volume is the “sister study” of his forthcoming book, Pope and the Destiny of the Stuarts, which will examine Pope’s early poem “as it confronts the realities of its age” (pp. 18–9). The implication, largely confirmed by what follows, is that Symbolic Design is about the backward-looking formal resources of Windsor-Forest rather than its “content,” its place in the sociopolitical present of the epochal year in which it was published, 1714. These are the resources of what loosely may be called the late-medieval and Renaissance panegyric mode—masque, allegory, emblem, pastoral retreat, royal tournament, triumph, and spectacle—and to show how deeply the young poet draws upon them Rogers plumbs the depths of several media, not only poetry and painting but also architecture, landscape gardening, numismatics, heraldry, and more. The effect of this method is less additive than thickening. In each case, that is, we “discover
not so much another level of meaning as an alternative system of signification that reinforces statements made in the poem by other means” (p. 107). By the same token, certain locales central to this topographical poem, especially the forest and the river, acquire an intratextual density by virtue of the intertextual richness in which they participate.

In a poem such as *Windsor-Forest*, of course, iconographic signification and political significance cannot easily be separated. It is not only that “Pope may be regarded as the last major English poet who was still in touch with these sources of art,” but also that he uses them “to produce an array of neo-Renaissance effects that might support the faltering Stuart dynasty.” Indeed, “[a]t one level *Windsor-Forest* may be viewed as an attempt to restore not just the Golden Age of Stuart England but a golden age of artistic representation” (pp. 40, 15, 46). The risk Rogers takes in splitting his subject matter into two volumes is therefore considerable, since it might enforce a “modern” sense of separation—between past and present, art and politics—that falsifies a central achievement of the poem on which Rogers would insist. In fact he is able to engage this separation with a kind of allusive provisionality that echoes the representational techniques he is at pains to recall: thus “the politics of Pope’s vision of Stuart concord are already inscribed in the iconographic language he employs” (p. 62). True, Rogers feels obliged to treat some of the poem’s sociopolitics directly, such as its position on British empire or on the Windsor Blacks, a topic to which *Windsor-Forest* was fruitfully tied by E. P. Thompson thirty years ago. But this topic also exemplifies the ties between the poem and the biographical “politics” of Pope’s own experience as a youth living on the edge of the forest, ties we are enabled to apprehend through a species of submerged analogy between the poem’s public or macrothemes and the personal or microthemes of the poet’s own early life that Rogers adumbrates with something of the “emblematic method” he ascribes to Pope himself (p. 99; see especially pp. 18, 77, 83, 124, and 159). In this way, the “symbolic design” of *Windsor-Forest* is a self-sufficient approach to the text that simultaneously alludes to its context, “Pope and the Destiny of the Stuarts.” Together, the two volumes will exemplify what seems to me the most effective method for disclosing the politics of a text—not as an alternative to, but as an outgrowth of, its formal procedures.

Limiting myself for lack of space to the poetic precursors on which Rogers shows Pope to have drawn in *Windsor-Forest*, the most important sources appear to be William Camden’s *Britannia*,...
Michael Drayton’s *Poly-Olbion*, John Denham’s *Coopers Hill*, and Dryden’s *Annus Mirabilis*, whose influence Rogers convincingly shows in Pope’s synthetic language choices. As Rogers argues in an exploratory and highly suggestive final chapter, these are also, more specifically, important models for *Windsor-Forest* because the structure of their arguments, especially as they involve patterns of verbal displacement, association, and recapitulation with a difference, clearly are exploited in *Windsor-Forest*’s scaffolding of spatial and temporal allusion. At the risk of seeming churlish amid this plenty, two other poems seem to me worth adding to that list. The first, Marvell’s *Upon Appleton House*, Rogers refers to less often, I think, than he might. The second, to which Rogers does not refer, is Dryden’s “To My Honour’d Kinsman, John Driden of Chesterton.” Here the similarities are numerous: structuring themes of war and peace, past and present, here (country) and there (London), trade, health, Eden, the Horatian retreat, national politics, figurative river banks, the emblematic hare, and the polyvalent image of the hunter who in turn is also the hunted. Most strikingly, “To Driden” uses its paragraphs to achieve uncanny “overlapping effects” like those of *Windsor-Forest*, but with even “tighter rhetorical engineering” than Pope has managed (pp. 230, 201). Rogers employs the latter phrase to compare positively *Windsor-Forest* to the ending of *Annus Mirabilis*, which, like *Windsor-Forest*, was the work of a young man establishing his reputation; but the circumstantial links with “To Driden” may be even more compelling. This verse epistle was published the year Dryden died, 1700, only fourteen years before *Windsor-Forest* appeared. Two years after the treaty that ended the Nine Years War and on the eve of a new century, Dryden uses this hopeful peace to reflect on England’s past and present much as Pope’s poem undertakes a similar project one year after the treaty that ended the War of the Spanish Succession, which followed so hard upon that other war as to seem its continuation. In other words, the political contexts of the two poems are virtually the same. The royalism of the young Dryden and the young Pope, at least on the evidence of their two youthful panegyrics, seems very close. But Dryden at the end of his life is both like and very unlike his poetic successor. Alienated from the centers of power for reasons that include but go beyond his conversion to the religion that from his birth made Pope an outsider, Dryden espouses not a royalist but a parliamentarian politics that prophesy the modern age with startling accuracy. Pope’s prophecy fourteen years later is lapidary, hopeful, but wrong.
Paul Baines’s *The Long Eighteenth Century* is a volume in the Arnold “Contexts” series on period fields in English and Anglo-American literature. A relatively slim volume (under two hundred pages), *The Long Eighteenth Century* has the look and feel of an introduction to the period, dividing its chapters into broad topics such as “Court and Parliament,” “Town, Country, Nation,” “Versions of the Self,” and “Sex and Gender,” and concluding with a chronology of authors. Baines fulfills the function of an introductory text with a straightforward, idiomatic style and a surprisingly economical organization that allow him to weave into and out of “contexts” by evoking and returning to literary texts as catalysts for contextual forays. The volume begins ingeniously by using selected poets from Johnson’s *Lives of the English Poets* to exemplify the biographical and poetic range of possibility in the period, as well as its limitations (none of Johnson’s poets is a woman). *Paradise Lost* serves as a running thread through at least the first half of the volume, its multiple concerns recurring to frame or deepen Baines’s themes as they develop—and, occasionally (as with Dryden’s *Absalom and Achitophel*) to instance the subtlety of intertextual allusion in this period. Baines is best on the contexts. He does justice to relatively recent developments in critical interest—to sex and gender, colonialism, the status of women—without seeming forced or preachy. And he has an epigrammatic facility in summarizing large literary historical movements: the Copyright Act of 1710 represents “a shift from political control to economic regulation not uncharacteristic of the period as a whole” (p. 2); “These two positions, patriarchal monarchy against consensual parliamentary democracy, were the poles on which political discussion of the period turned” (p. 40). Another of Baines’s organizational strategies is to begin each chapter with a brief “document”—a publishing contract, excerpts from a sermon, a tract, a philosophical treatise—a strategy Baines thoughtfully defends as suggesting “that documentary reality, the textual residue of the real world, can be subject to the same kinds of critical reading as those texts we know as literary” (p. xii).

The downside of this approach lies in the way the texts sometimes are treated. Baines covers a great deal of territory through brief references to one or another text, but he also discusses a few—e.g. (besides *Paradise Lost*), *Oroonoko*, *Robinson Crusoe*, and *The Deserted Village*—in greater detail. These discussions are heavy on plot summary and light on attention to formal matters and leave one wondering about the relationship these readings are supposed to have to the literary texts that presumably will be assigned in a course for which this volume also is required.
I regret having so little space to describe Conrad Brunström’s fresh and intelligent study *William Cowper: Religion, Satire, Society*. Like most scholars these days, Brunström aims to read Cowper as the (troubled) culmination of eighteenth-century poetry rather than as a (failed) Wordsworth. To this end he places Cowper in an eighteenth-century line of what he calls “spiritual aesthetics” (p. 14), a term that economically captures both the aestheticization of religion and the spiritualization of art that characterize much of late-century culture. Brunström brings considerable understanding of the intellectual history of both processes to his task—although in his treatment of Addison and his followers I think he attends too closely to the aesthetic’s approach to divinity and not closely enough to the (aesthetic) imagination’s autonomy as a mediating faculty that escapes the difficulties of both empirical sense perception and the understanding. This reading of the aesthetic in fact might support Brunström’s view that Cowper’s intellectual and spiritual “oscillation” is “not to be explained in terms of ‘values,’ but rather in terms of tense, symbiotic relations between values” (p. 20). In any case, Brunström unostentatiously exemplifies the utility of this figure in bringing together the range of Cowperian themes: religious despair, lunacy, digressiveness, “moral satire,” common sense, maritime terror, undulating landscapes, and the collapsing antinomies of pastoralism. Brunström apportions his time well both in Cowper’s texts and in the texts and contexts that immediately precede him, although the persistent preoccupation with Milton and Matthew Prior is investigated as well. Most acutely, Brunström has proleptic and subjective recourse to a latter-day Cowper, Georg Simmel.

**COLLECTIONS**

As John Richetti, the editor of *The Cambridge History of English Literature, 1660–1780*, informs us in his introduction, this substantial collection of thirty essays replaces a predecessor that is almost a hundred years old. The differences between the two that Richetti goes on to summarize are remarkable. For present purposes they can be sensed in two of the six headings that organize the new essays: “Literary Production and Dissemination: Changing Audiences and Emerging Media,” and “Literature and Intellectual Life: The Production and Transmission of Culture.” To recount the history of English (really, British—see p. 6) literature between 1660 and 1780 at our historical moment not only requires the recourse to methods of contextualization that became common during the last decades of the twentieth
century, but also more specifically demands an understanding of context itself as, crucially, the material and technological conditions under which eighteenth-century texts were produced and consumed. In his conclusion to the *Cambridge History*, Clifford Siskin exemplifies this approach through the persuasive suggestion that the emergence of literature as a qualitatively distinct category has a lot to do with the quantitative explosion of books in the later eighteenth century. Still, given the evident potential of “the history of the book” these days to offer the quick answer to all literary historical questions, Richetti was wise to anchor the opening of this volume in two essays—by James Raven on publishing and bookselling and Dustin Griffin on the social world of authorship—that provide a reliably grounded account of what print culture actually amounted to in technological and material terms (although I think Griffin is harder on Jürgen Habermas than is warranted).

Not that all the essays are framed by this sort of concern. Two of the major headings organize essays on literary genres: first, the backward-looking “Adaptation and Reformation,” then the future-oriented “Transformation and New Forms of Expressiveness.” But the trend toward constructivist contextualization rather than the seeming integrity of the text or the genre is perhaps visible even here, where, alongside essays on genres in their traditional self-identity appear ones that bristle with a rich generic eclecticism, e.g., “Political, Satirical, Didactic and Lyric Poetry” (in two parts, before and after Pope, respectively by J. Paul Hunter and John Sitter). This sort of emphasis is clear as well in Lance Bertelsen’s welcome effort, in another part of the *Cambridge History*, to generalize about the by-definition-ungener
alizable in “Popular Entertainment and Instruction, Literary and Dramatic: Chapbooks, Advice Books, Almanacs, Ballads, Farces, Pantomimes, Prints, and Shows.” Indeed, there is the occasional ambition to display a new subgenre, although William B. Warner’s suggestive essay, “A New Form of Entertainment on the Market: the Novels of Amorous Intrigue,” is clouded by the necesssity of downplaying as much as possible one of the most obvious prec
edent forms of entertainment in which the narratives of Behn, Delarivier Manley, and Haywood are rooted, political allegory. By contrast, two of the longest essays, by Terry Castle on the gothic novel and Carole Fabricant on travel literature, deepen the interest their authors brought to these forms almost twenty years ago in *The New Eighteenth Century* without sacrificing to their status as “new forms of expressiveness” a sensitivity to their embeddedness in older forms.
A century ago it was common to practice a great-man theory of literary history whose premise was the determinacy of authorial identity. Richetti’s collection contains only two essays on single authors, Steven N. Zwicker’s on Dryden and Michael Seidel’s on Swift. And if there are signs in Richetti’s *Cambridge History* that this identitarian assumption is being replaced in some quarters by the radical contextualism of technological determinism, many contributors evince a richer and more varied view of how and why literature changed in the eighteenth century. This is particularly true in those essays that ask how contemporaries themselves saw the old category of *litterae humaniores* being divided up: Lawrence Lipking’s and, in another vein, Robert Folkenflik’s, on the emergence of a brand of history that is both literary and English (or British), or the essays by Karen O’Brien, Michael B. Prince, and Isabel Rivers on the evolving relationship of literature and (respectively) history, philosophy, and religion. In briefly reflecting on a volume as compendious as this one it is needless to say how much of interest and value it contains that I haven’t been able even to allude to. The centurial significance of the *Cambridge History of English Literature, 1660–1780*, its status as the first of its kind since George Saintsbury and his Peace of the Augustans, only furthers the importance of Richetti’s collection.

In *The Cambridge Companion to English Literature, 1740–1830*, Thomas Keymer and Jon Mee programmatically advance a mode of periodization very different from that of Wahrman, one in which the putative discontinuity of 1776 or thereabouts is smoothed over and swallowed up by the continuity of 1740–1830. This diverting and instructive experiment in literary-historical revisionism, for which there is considerable support these days in other quarters (Susan Wolfson and my colleague William Galperin more than once have posited “The Romantic Century”), calls for rethinking the standard subcategories of analysis. Gone is the big, obligatory chapter on the five great (or the two generations of) romantic poets; in its place are three essays—“Blake and the Poetics of Enthusiasm” (Mee), “The Lake School: Wordsworth and Coleridge” (Paul Magnuson), and “Keats, Shelley, Byron, and the Hunt Circle” (Greg Kucich)—whose protagonists are seen as partaking in trends and movements that precede them (although this is less true of Kucich’s essay than of the others). Some topics, such as “Sensibility” (Susan Manning) and “Gothic” (James Watt), we already are accustomed to treat as bridging the “classic to romantic” gap. Others, such as Mee’s essay, John Goodridge and Bridget Keenan’s “John Clare and the Traditions of Labouring-Class Verse,” and Keymer’s “Sterne and Romantic autobiography”
ingeniously define for their single authors a context that requires retrospection. Keymer’s piece helpfully reverses the common view of Sterne as a proleptic modernist by placing him in a tradition of spiritual autobiography both factual and fictional that begins with John Bunyan’s *Grace Abounding* and includes Defoe’s *Robinson Crusoe*. Still other essays—Simon Jarvis’s “Criticism, Taste, Aesthetics,” Barbara M. Benedict’s “Readers, Writers, Reviewers, and the Professionalization of Literature”—achieve a similar effect in the absence of a single central figure.

The quality of these essays is generally high; my eye was caught in particular by those of Manning and Jarvis, both of which capitalize on the revised time frame to reflect acutely on their respective subjects. The title of Peter Sabor’s “Richardson, Henry Fielding, and Sarah Fielding” seems to promise a more innovative way of revising how we think about the crucial but weary conjunction/disjunction of Richardson and Fielding than it finally delivers: “Far from acting as a bridge between the rival novelists, as has often been suggested, Sarah Fielding served, unwittingly, to drive them ever further apart” (p. 153). Occasionally the welcome impulse to question the idea of a sharp break at 1789 or 1798 (not to mention 1776) can have the subtle and surely unintended effect of understating how fundamental the changes were on which the coherence of 1740–1830 depends. In his interesting discussion of “Literature and Politics,” for example, Michael Scrivener remarks that it was because of the emergence of the Habermasian public sphere of private citizens reflecting on public politics that “the sense that we now have that everything cultural is also political originates in this period” (p. 43). But the logical precondition for this conflationary politicization of culture, and what gives us the public sphere in the first place, is the explicit separation out of the state from civil society without which the conflation of politics and culture would not even have been thinkable. But this may be to carp. *The Cambridge Companion to English Literature, 1740–1830* is a thoughtful experiment in periodizing that will expand the minds of readers accustomed to more centurially based conceptions of literary history.

*The Cambridge History of British Theatre, Vol. 2: 1660–1895* is the second in a three-volume series. Its editor, Joseph Donohue, has divided the volume’s essays into two parts covering 1660–1800 and 1800–95, each of which contains nine essays as well as an introduction by the editor. The collection is framed at one end by an unusually long (seventy-page) chronology of theatrical events, 1660–1895, and at the other by a bibliography and index.
The challenge of part 1’s chronological scope is met by nine essays of varying purpose. The first four are general and topical, addressing repertory (Robert D. Hume), the female presence (Joanne Lafler), politics and morality (Derek Hughes), and theater companies and regulation (Judith Milhous). The last four essays combine the topical with the chronological: Mark S. Auburn focuses on David Garrick at Drury Lane, Görel Garlick on theater outside London, and Edward A. Langhaus on the “critical year” 1776, while Jane Moody’s essay on “the theatrical revolution” takes us from Garrick’s retirement in 1776 to 1843, the date of the Theatre Regulation Act, which ended the monopoly of both the Drury Lane and Covent Garden patent theaters and “legitimate” drama on the British stage. Mediating between these two sets of essays is Calhoun Winton’s case study of *The Beggar’s Opera*, which opened in 1728 (the corresponding case study in part 2 of this volume is of *The Bells* [opened 1871]). Because Donohue’s two introductory but comprehensive essays total nearly one-quarter of the entire commentary, there is the danger of overlap and repetition in this arrangement. However, some of the repetition serves the positive purpose of substantive emphasis and elaboration, and the broad coverage provided by Donohue’s writings also permits the other essayists to focus their discussions more closely than otherwise would be possible. This volume of *The Cambridge History of British Theatre* is adorned by thirty-five well-chosen illustrations of theaters, playbills, actors, and performances.

Occasioned (at least by way of introduction) by claims that advances in digital technology allowing scientists to sequence the human genome provide an immediate, continuous, and therefore total “mapping” of the species, *Regimes of Description in the Archive of the Eighteenth Century* has two aims, one epistemological and one historical. First, in their brief introduction the editors of this collection, John Bender and Michael Marrinan, point out that the plausibility of fulfilling the dream of “objective” description depends on what we mean by the latter term. If to describe a material object means to replicate it, the human genome project falls far short of that goal because what it produces is rather a representation of the object, however technologically precise its means of representation may be. Second, Bender and Marrinan invited their contributors (the book originated in a conference) to reflect on “the history of description.” Taking off from Foucault’s celebrated hypothesis of a late-eighteenth-century epistemic break, the editors suggest a loose analogy between that moment and ours. And as their skepticism about euphoric claims for the
digital revolution forewarns, the resulting essays are also skepti-
cal, to a “surprising . . . degree,” about what the editors call the
rupture in “the ‘regime’ of description” that Foucault located two
centuries earlier in the “separation of deductive and formal sci-
ences from empirical sciences” (p. 4).

For those of us who never found much to credit in the histori-
ography of sudden discontinuity this result may be less surpris-
ing. But most of the essays contained in Regimes of Description
are thoughtful and strong (nearly half of them are versions of
previously published material), especially as they provide an
antidote to persistent misconceptions about eighteenth-century
epistemology. The kinds of description they take up range widely,
from scientific, vitalist, philosophical, historical, and economic to
linguistic, architectural, sculptural, artistic, realist, sublime, and
aesthetic. The contributors also seem to vary on where they stand
regarding the Foucauldian model. Some would appear to date the
rupture earlier, some argue a greater continuity, some ask us to
reconceive what “Classical representation” really amounted to,
some challenge the idea of Enlightenment modernity, and others
that of Enlightenment traditionalism. What seems to unite these
essays is a commitment to the notion that eighteenth-century
modes of description were in various ways oscillatory (to use a
term that already has arisen), working between “diversity” and
“unity” (Peter Hanns Reill, p. 159), “thematic” or “first-order” and
“formal” or “second-order observation” (David E. Wellbery, pp.
206–7), the “militant empiricism” of the particular (Lorraine Das-
ton, p. 16) and the “naive universalism” of the general (Wolfgang
Klein, p. 85) rather than resting for very long in either camp.

In her editorial introduction to A Concise Companion to the
Restoration and Eighteenth Century, Cynthia Wall confides that
when she first was invited to commission and edit the essays
that compose this collection its working title was New Perspec-
tives. Its revised and final description as a Companion implies
“an introduction or a standard companion in the sense of laying
out the basic territory to the novice pilgrim,” whereas what Wall
had sought was the kind of essay that “takes on certain widely
held assumptions about eighteenth-century cultural contexts or
literary practices, and pokes, prods, or overturns them” (p. 3). As
Wall tells us, she has aimed in 2004 to do for eighteenth-century
studies something like what the editors of The New Eighteenth
Century accomplished in 1987 (p. 11). The heady invitation to
be innovatively revisionary is likely to be accepted in a variety of
ways, as the eclecticism of The New Eighteenth Century demon-
strates. The best essays in _A Concise Companion_ are those that ground their polemics in a secure knowledge of the critical traditions they would revise and therefore proceed with some degree of modesty regarding their own innovative powers. I lack space to acknowledge all instances of this in _A Concise Companion_ and must limit myself to a few.

Perhaps to counter a tendency to see geography as an arid quantifying specialism, Miles Ogborn and Charles W. J. Withers aim to do justice to eighteenth-century geography as literally a mode of “earth writing” that used spatial discourse to engage contemporary issues of political definition, economic circulation, and representational veracity through techniques of depiction and inscription that possess their own armory of formal convention. At the other end of the collection, Mark Salber Phillips takes something like the opposite tack in urging us to see in the flourishing literary history of the eighteenth century not only a content but a special form of historiography, one that both constituted and addressed the history of manners and moral sentiments and emphasized the relativity of cultural forms in ways that were unavailable to histories of public life. Finally, Rachel Crawford shows how the development of georgic, lyric, and garden modes in the later eighteenth century reveals a powerfully English valuation of the sublime as the product of enclosed and concentrated spaces rather than of epic vastness or boundless views alone.

Other essays in this collection exemplify what happens when polemical ambition outstrips its object. To be sure, J. A. Downie’s critique of “the myth of the bourgeois public sphere” (p. 58) has much to rebut in the intemperate applications literary (and other) scholars have made of Habermas’s wildly influential conception. For the most part, however, Downie attributes these errors to Habermas himself. True, Habermas was not widely and deeply read in English history, and I agree that the rise of the public sphere might well be backdated to 1642. But Downie, a scholar of great range and accomplishment, makes far too much heavy weather, I think, over the category of the _bürgerlich_ in Habermas’s usage, a term that his translator might have done better to render “civil” rather than “bourgeois” since the idea that the bourgeoisie or the middle class rose in the seventeenth century is inimical to Habermas’s thesis that the public sphere had its origins not in class formation but in the separation of the state from civil society. Downie has nothing to say about this separation, as the problems he finds in the Habermas thesis suggest. In my understanding, Habermas posits the public sphere neither over
against “a separate ‘private’ sphere” nor as a space “between” the public and the private (pp. 68, 59), but as a development within the private realm. The fact that Habermas distinguishes between the principle of universal access to the public sphere on the one hand and the practical failure of that principle on the other is not evidence of his effort “to get round the problem” (p. 69), nor is his account of it as a place where reason rather than social status or sex was to prevail a claim that all argument there either was (or was supposed to be) “disinterested” or transpired in concert with “the elision of social distinctions” (pp. 73, 70). Habermas’s point is, I think, that the very conceptualization of the public sphere at this time marks the epochal moment when English people began to conceive that public policy should be shaped by citizens and not by the government alone, that the idea of the public interest should be premised on the conviction that interests are multiple and that no single interest—not even that of the monarch—is universal or absolute. Finally, Downie’s difficulty in making sense of the category of the “literary public sphere”—“it seems confusing to suggest that, despite being confined to . . . the home, women could participate in the public sphere simply by taking the opportunity to read the writings of others” (p. 73)—owes to the fact that he hasn’t taken in Habermas’s postulation of a public sphere that is virtual, not actual—not just a literal place like the coffee houses but also a collective conception whose existence and efficacy depend on the convictions of those who would partake in it and “come together” through it. To recognize the value of Habermas’s public-sphere idea requires that we approach it not from the stringent and skeptical liberal-democratic viewpoint of our contemporary present but from the absolutist, status-driven, hierarchical viewpoint of the traditional past. We need to ask not: is the public sphere up to our standards? but: what did the public sphere replace?

My other negative example, the essay in A Concise Companion by Deidre Shauna Lynch, is easier to describe because it doesn’t entail genuinely complicated issues of historical interpretation. On the contrary, Lynch’s polemical style is based on a simple principle. If you want to claim originality, your first task is to ignore or misrepresent scholarship that refutes your claim by already having said what you want to say. Lynch’s main argument is that we must outgrow the “nineteenth-century” belief that “social division” and the rise of “individualism” are central to understanding the rise of the novel and recognize that it is instead “social motion” that demands our attention (p. 123). By “social motion” Lynch
alludes to a number of things: novelistic themes of transport, transaction, and the mobility of objects, property ("moving goods"), and people (p. 123); the emotional exchange ("moving writing") of which novels are capable (p. 124); novelistic reflexivity that thematizes the technology of the "movable type" that produces novels (p. 132); increased rates of change as manifested in plot narration; the circulation and exchange of geographically disparate novel forms; most of all, the themes and thematized forms of "social mixing" and social "relationship" that dominate the novel (pp. 123, 137, 138). In other words, the eighteenth-century novel "defined itself as a machine for social interconnection" (p. 140); it looked at characters "not so much as individuals, but rather, first and foremost, as transients . . . unmoored from . . . traditional corporate identities" (p. 123).

Two points are in order. First, Lynch's spunky, no-nonsense persona—clearing the cobwebs from the Victorian house of fiction—is based in the reductive crudity with which she represents the work of Ian Watt, who engages all of these ideas of "social motion" that Lynch would have us see as exemplary of her critical reclamation project, a project predicated on the repudiation of The Rise of the Novel and its blinkered concern with the individual. Second, this will surprise no sentient reader, because to be concerned with individuality is to be concerned with sociability, and vice versa. When Watt (and others) says the rise of the novel and the rise of individualism are coextensive, he doesn’t mean (can anyone really believe he could have meant?) "and this rules out sociability." On the contrary, for Watt (not to mention Theodor Adorno, Georg Lukács, Max Weber, Simmel, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx), the category of the individual and the category of society emerge simultaneously and reciprocally in the early modern period. The traditional culture they emerge from is so interwoven with tacit social practices and the stabilizing purposes they serve that individuation in the modern sense of the term is inconceivable; as is "society," which also can be conceptualized only when it has something to be defined against. Social mobility is not the exclusionary opposite of the individual; it is the process by which the individual becomes intelligible as a meaningful category. To be a "transient unmoored from traditional corporate identities" is—precisely—to become an individual. In short, social motion is individuation.

The year 2004 was distinguished by the publication of three new collections of essays on John Dryden, a conjunction that in large part can be explained by the tercentenary marking of
Dryden’s death four years earlier. Two volumes assemble essays derived from papers given at tercentenary conferences in 2000, respectively at Yale University and UCLA: *John Dryden (1631–1700): His Politics, His Plays, and His Poets*, edited by Claude Rawson and Aaron Santesso, and *Enchanted Ground: Reimagining John Dryden*, edited by Jayne Lewis and Maximillian E. Novak. The third volume is *The Cambridge Companion to John Dryden*, edited by Steven N. Zwicker. Dryden’s appeal and importance are both broad and deep, and there is surprisingly little overlap of personnel among the forty-three contributors to these volumes: of these Zwicker writes on Dryden and Virgil, Dryden’s religion, and Dryden’s modernity; Annabel Patterson treats Dryden and Marvell and Dryden’s politics; and Love’s two essays reflect in quite different ways on town, city, and London in Dryden’s lifetime. There are some topical overlaps: Love and Lawrence Manley share the title “Dryden’s London” in the *Cambridge Companion* and *John Dryden*, respectively. Like Patterson in the *Cambridge Companion*, Novak in *John Dryden* writes on Dryden’s politics; John Spurr’s treatment of Dryden’s religion (*Cambridge Companion*) takes a different approach than Zwicker does (*Enchanted Ground*) to that notoriously problematic subject. But generalizations based even on essay titles soon founder on the shoals of specificity, combinatorial and other. This can be seen in three essays in *Enchanted Ground*: “Dryden, Marvell, and the Design of Political Poetry” (Leo Braudy); “Wit, Politics, and Religion: Dryden and Gibbon” (Susan Staves); and “Dryden and Dissent” (Sharon Achinstein). When we venture beyond titles, of course, the network of topical overlap ramifies considerably (thus embedded within David Haley’s essay on political satire in *Enchanted Ground* is an extended comparison of Dryden and Marvell).

As we might expect, the *Cambridge Companion* tries hardest to cover the territory in a fashion suitable to the quasi-introductory purposes of a literary companion. Even so, its contributors conjoin Dryden with some uncommon but well-warranted topics: empire (Laura Brown), the invention of Augustan culture (Paul Davis); triplets (Christopher Ricks); and anonymity (John Mullan). *John Dryden* organizes its essays under two headings that, seemingly modal (first plays, then poetry), also focus more particularly on the politics of Dryden’s plays and on his poetic relationships with other poets past and present (see Rawson’s preface, p. 9). Yet more clearly, the sectioning of *Enchanted Ground*, the first part “involving politics and society, and the second treating problems of aesthetics in the . . . poems, plays, [and] songs” (introduction, p.
7) offers a loose division between politics and poetry, context and text whose heuristic function is to stress how problematic such divisions must be in assessing the work of the English canon’s most contextually embedded political poet. *Enchanted Ground* also includes a CD recording of four of Dryden’s songs, accompanied by harpsichord, cello, and flute, produced by James A. Winn, and keyed here to Winn’s enlightening essay on “Dryden’s Songs.”

*The Cambridge Companion to Aphra Behn*, edited by Derek Hughes and Janet Todd, enlists fourteen scholars to bring the burgeoning studies of this now-canonical author up to the present. Todd, Behn’s editor and biographer, is the critic most responsible for making this ascent possible, while Hughes, an authority on Restoration drama, tells us that in the middle decades of the Restoration period Behn had more new plays produced than any other playwright. Since Behn is that rare figure, an important writer in all three of the literary modes, some ingenuity is required to cover the territory. Hughes provides an overview of Behn in the context of Restoration theater in which he pays welcome attention to stagecraft, especially how Behn exploits the post-1660 theater’s innovative capacity to divide and subdivide the space of the stage. Susan J. Owen then performs a broadly similar role regarding not the theatrical resources but the political themes of Behn’s plays. Behn’s least familiar generic efforts in drama, tragedy and tragicomedy, are described in a joint essay by the editors. Finally, the comedies are taken up in two well-balanced essays. On the one hand, Robert Markley ranges over the comedies with several aims in mind, perhaps the most interesting of which is the effort to generalize about how Behn allows her heroines to honor the exploitative gender rituals of her day while maintaining a knowing detachment from them. On the other hand, Helen M. Burke concentrates on one play, *The Rover*, to show how its dramatic treatment of the figure of the cavalier parodically complicates, in a feminist direction, the usual royalist idealizations.

The *Cambridge Companion* allocates four essays to Behn’s prose fiction. Laura J. Rosenthal and Joanna Lipking provide complementary essays on Behn’s most celebrated narrative, *Oroonoiko*, the former focusing on Behn’s subtle discrimination between narrative tones of voice and the latter on the contexts of Behn’s treatment of slavery and colonialism at the end of the seventeenth century. Jacqueline Pearson uses a survey of critical approaches to reflect on the forms and themes that tie together Behn’s other short fiction, and Ros Ballaster takes up the enigmatic development of characterization and narrative form in *Love-Letters*. This
leaves only two essays on Behn’s poetry, but here too an effective reciprocity is achieved by Melinda S. Zook’s essay on Behn’s political poetry, which throws into relief her “fixation” on Monmouth in the years before the Rye House Plot, and by Jessica Munns’s persuasive argument that pastoral suffuses Behn’s poetry in ways that are far from predictable. The collection comes to a close with Line Cottegnies’s essay on Behn’s French translations. It opens with Mary Ann O’Donnell’s summary of what little we know of Behn’s life through the documentary record and Susan Staves’s reflections on how Behn negotiated three contemporary ideologies relevant to the nature and status of women: the Anglican, the economic and legal, and the libertine.

Although Peter Cryle and Lisa O’Connell tell us that the volume they have edited, Libertine Enlightenment: Sex, Liberty, and License in the Eighteenth Century, “moves past” the view of the Enlightenment as an “age of great thinkers”—Locke, Hume, Denis Diderot, Voltaire, Immanuel Kant—in fact its essays frequently announce their discursive concerns in association with thinkers, great and otherwise: Sterne, John Wilkes, William Warburton, Giacomo Casanova, Kant, the Marquis de Sade, Delarivier Manley, and others. Of course Cryle and O’Connell’s aim is to get away from the focus less on thinkers than on conventionally “great” thinkers, and in sympathy with this aim they also would replace the idea of the “Enlightenment” by the idea of “multiple enlightenments.” However, this endorsement of the multiple over the monolithic is quickly qualified by the further thought that “libertine enlightenment(s?)” might do as well as any single term to capture the totality, so long as we understand that “libertinism—the self-aware, philosophically oriented practice of more or less sexualized freedom—merges into libertinage—the vernacular, dissident freedoms of everyday life” (pp. 12). This kind of oscillation between the whole and its parts is itself characteristic of Enlightenment thought, also of modern thinking about what “libertinism” means. Cryle and O’Connell are aware that some might see their sexually oriented understanding of the category as insufficiently attentive to the philosophical and political meanings of the term. They don’t show much interest in religious libertinism, that other great contender for semantic priority, perhaps because their curiosity lies more in looking forward than in looking back in time—a suggestion that is supported precisely by the centrality of sex to their conception of this volume.

The eclectic quality of the essays themselves (in fact religious libertinism does arise with some frequency) is in keeping with
this benign equivocation on the nature of the phenomenon under investigation. And this is perhaps as it should be, given the fact that this particular indeterminate category is etymologically rooted in the idea of liberty as a negative condition, a freedom from: its essence is to be found in its manifold unconstraint. Just about anything goes—although the emphasis is more on French than on other literary cultures, and one section of the volume contains four essays that explicitly concentrate on the significant question of how eighteenth-century women might be seen as "libertine." The average length is a moderate fifteen pages, although Iain McCalman’s narrative about a swindle perpetrated on Marie Antoinette is twice as long. Libertine Enlightenment also mixes methods of criticism, moving back and forth between theoretical synthesis, textual analysis, and biographical story-telling, the latter two predominating. What unites these styles of procedure is a fairly common thickness of circumstantial detail, briefly immersing the reader in a world and a demimonde that seem only rather more strange than they do familiar.

The obvious problems involved in assembling a Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing that begins with Columbus and eschews spatial/national limitations are ingeniously engaged by its editors, Peter Hulme and Tim Youngs, through an organization of overlapping levels of focus. Travel Writing is divided into three parts. The first part consists of five broad (and overlapping) chronological surveys of the field: 1500–1720, 1660–1840 (the Grand Tour), 1720–1914 (travel outside Europe), 1880–1940, and 1940–2000. The second part of Travel Writing traverses the same territory as the first but from a spatial perspective that treats each region both in general and as exemplified by one important constituent locale: The Middle East/Arabia, South America/Amazonia, The Pacific/Tahiti, Africa/The Congo, The Isles/Ireland, India/Calcutta, and the West/California. The third part treats three important “topics” associated with travel writing, gender, ethnography, and the theory of travel writing. The collection concludes with parallel chronologies of travel writing and travel-related events and suggestions for further reading.

The effect of this organization is that it requires readers who are interested in a particular aspect of travel writing, e.g., its eighteenth-century practice, to read through much if not all of the book, a requirement that is less a hardship than an opportunity given the perspectival crosscurrents that enrich what in a more serial arrangement would gain definition at the expense of contextuality. The authors of the essays have been chosen with care,
and the authority of their surveys is enhanced by the inclusiveness (within limits) of their endnotes. The major liability of this sort of organization is that some topics run the risk of falling between two (or more) stools. My first impression was that this had been the fate of the Restoration Royal Society and its profound interest in the conjunctive circulations of knowledge and commodities and in the epistemology and style of travel writing. William H. Sherman’s survey of 1500–1720 does no more than raise this topic (p. 29), and it makes no appearance either in James Buzard’s or Roy Bridges’s survey of the following periods, 1660–1840 and 1720–1914. However, in reading forward I found that Joan Pau Rubiés pursues these aspects of scientific travel as “ethnographic” developments (pp. 252–3, 257–8), and although one might quibble about the adequacy of that categorization, the important point is that in this test case, anyway, the organizational strategies of Hulme and Youngs seem to be successful.

Like its predecessors, *Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture* 33 publishes a selection of essays based on papers delivered at a regional or national meeting of ASECS. These volumes tend to include essays by a wide range of scholars, from graduate students to leaders in their fields, and this one is no exception. Dominated by English topics, the eighteen essays range from the 1720s to the 1790s and from familiar to less-familiar forms—from the novel, pastoral poetry, epistolary correspondence, sea journals, and the graphic arts to advertisements, prison reform discourse, and infant’s petitions. SECC remains a fascinating cross section of what our profession is doing these days, a grab bag of critical and scholarly arguments that transcends the adventitious and unreliable nature of a grab bag through the SECC Editorial Board’s careful vetting and the informed labor of each volume’s editors, who this year are Catherine Ingrassia and Jeffrey S. Ravel.

With the current issue, *1650–1850: Ideas, Aesthetics, and Inquiries in the Early Modern Era* celebrates its tenth anniversary of amused, and not infrequently amusing, nonconformity with what it takes to be the spirits of the age. In his foreword to volume 10, Kevin L. Cope addresses this milestone in the droll and waggish persona (or not?) that has given this annual journal its distinctive air since its inception. As he recounts it, *1650–1850* arose out of a motive to buck the prevailing trend toward “diversity”—suppressing canonical authors and texts and exhuming others that had been buried for good reason—not just by returning to the canon nor by the disinterment of more deserving corpses but also by demonstrating that the authentic cultural diversity of the long
eighteenth century was “eccentric, odd, retrograde, reactionary,” in short more antipathetic to contemporary values of diversity than has been thought (p. xiv).

Even in its material form, 1650–1850, more like a book than a serial publication, performs a certain eccentricity. This issue, typical of the journal, is over 400 pages long and contains eleven free-standing essays followed by a “Special Feature” section of six essays called “Enlightening the Renaissance” that addresses a number of different sorts of interchange between the Renaissance and the long eighteenth century. After the special feature section come the book reviews—sixteen in this volume, commissioned and overseen by the new book review editor, Scott Paul Gordon. These in turn are followed by “Editor’s Choice: Underapplauded Books,” another continuing feature of 1650–1850, in which Cope reviews two studies he thinks have been unjustly neglected by reviewers and readers. The issue concludes, like a book, with a name index to the entire volume, throughout which are scattered fourteen illustrations (again, as in a book) keyed to some of its essays.

If the journal’s announced “reactionary” attitude toward contemporary trends in the field is reflected in the essays themselves, it takes the subtletized and occasional form of gratuitous erudition, histrionic harangues, and learned accounts of offbeat items—in this issue the glass armonica—at least some of which treatments are enhanced by a delicate self-irony. But the journal apparently solicits and receives submissions from a wide range of contributors, and it doesn’t begin to possess a house style or an antimodernist axe to grind. In volume 10 there are essays on Margaret Cavendish, Mary Astell, and Mary Leapor that are thoughtfully sympathetic with their subjects. There are also essays on Etienne Condillac’s language theory and the dramatic politics of William Davenant and John Tatham, as well as readings of Robinson Crusoe, Humphry Clinker, Boswell’s London Journal, and revisions of King Lear. In short, 1650–1850 is by and large a good read and an intellectually responsible read, a worthwhile component of our literary public sphere that deserves our well-wishes on its tenth birthday.

While on the subject, congratulations are due also to The Age of Johnson: A Scholarly Annual, which published its fifteenth volume in 2004. The chronological scope of this yearly serial, as focused as that of 1650–1850 is sweeping, is eighty years, at both ends venturing beyond, but not too far beyond, the strict confines of Johnson’s lived career as the exemplary man of letters. In their preface the editors, the late Paul J. Korshin and Jack Lynch, provide a brief overview of the history of Johnsonian
studies whose third phase, sustained by the present undertaking, began in the 1950s with studies by celebrated scholars—R. W. Chapman, James L. Clifford, and Donald Greene, to name three—who redirected attention away from Boswell’s Johnson to Johnson’s own work in (as was observed shortly after his death) “fourteen different genres” (p. x).

Read from this perspective, The Age of Johnson fully justifies its status as heir to one of our great traditions of eighteenth-century scholarship. It broadly resembles its slightly younger peer 1650–1850 in length and organization. Twelve substantial essays are followed by two review essays (one of which, by Lisa Berglund, is an extended and useful survey of recent anthologies of eighteenth-century literature), twenty-one single-book reviews, and a name index to the entire volume. Although both the essay and the review sections begin with a more-or-less exclusive focus on Johnson’s writings, The Age of Johnson is also interested, as Berglund’s contribution makes clear, in other related topics: Edward Gibbon, Hannah More, Burney, Hester Lynch Piozzi, as well as patronage, travel writing, skepticism, utopian writing, and a long (over sixty pages), minutely detailed, and anomalous setting-the-record-straight account of “The History of ESTC.” For the most part, however, both the pertinence of The Age of Johnson to its titular ambition and its continuing importance for eighteenth-century criticism are manifest in its fifteenth volume.

EDITIONS

Several new editions deserve notice. Arguably the most important of these is The Works of Mary Leapor, edited by Richard Greene and the late Ann Messenger, the first publication of her two volumes of Poems Upon Several Occasions (1748, 1751) since their original printing. Greene, the author of a 1993 monograph on Leapor, completed this edition after the death of his co-editor. It is of course much more than a reprinting. Greene and Messenger give us the poetry in its original ordering with minimal modernization, accompanied by textual and explanatory notes and an introduction that reviews the very little that is known about Leapor’s life and that outlines recent critical debate on the significance of her writings. Also included in this volume are some of Leapor’s letters and a never-performed “domestic tragedy” whose reception by Colley Cibber can be deduced from one of those letters (p. 301) and from the title of one of Leapor’s poems: “Upon Her Play Being Returned to Her, Stained with Claret” (p.
211). The fact of Leapor’s importance as a poet is increasingly hard to question. For years I’ve taught a selection of her poems photocopied from the printings of 1748 and 1751, finding them to constitute a crucial stage in eighteenth-century experiments with pastoral and georgic form that mediates between Marvell, Behn, Anne Finch, Pope, Gay, and Swift on the one hand and Oliver Goldsmith, Crabbe, and beyond on the other. This edition, like Janet Todd’s of Behn, should help propel Leapor into deserved canonicity.

Liberty Fund, which has made a name for itself publishing (among other things) inexpensive reprints of scholarly editions of eighteenth-century historical, sociopolitical, and philosophical classics, has published its own instantaneously standard edition of Francis Hutcheson’s *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. Wolfgang Leidhold has edited Hutcheson’s celebrated and highly influential work with scrupulous attention to textual and intellectual detail. The *Inquiry* now gains the accessibility already enjoyed by related texts in moral philosophy and proto-aesthetics by Shaftesbury, Addison, Mandeville, Burke, and Smith.

Also published in 2004 is the tenth title in the Wesleyan Edition of the Works of Henry Fielding, *Plays: Volume I, 1728–1731*. The first of three projected volumes of Fielding’s plays, this one contains some of Fielding’s most hilarious and beloved *jeux d’esprit*, *Love in Several Masques*, *The Temple Beau*, *The Author’s Farce*, *Tom Thumb*, *The Coffee-House Politician*, *The Tragedy of Tragedies*, and *The Letter-Writers*. Thomas Lockwood has edited this hefty volume with the authority and care we have come to expect both from this well-known Fielding scholar and from the Wesleyan Fielding Edition, one of the great multivolume editions of canonical English authors in current publication. Enthusiasts of Fielding’s novels find in the dramatic works of his early career a fascinating generic turn on themes and even forms that preoccupy him as a novelist. But the first importance of the plays is as major documents in early-eighteenth-century dramatic and theatrical history.

**ANTHOLOGIES**

Michael Caines has performed an important service to eighteenth-century pedagogy by editing the moderately priced *Major Voices: Eighteenth-Century Women Playwrights*, an anthology that reprints six plays spanning most of the century: Susannah
Centlivre’s *A Bold Stroke for a Wife*, Haywood’s *A Wife to Be Let*, Burney’s *The Witlings*, Hannah Cowley’s *The Belle’s Stratagem*, Elizabeth Inchbald’s *Lover’s Vows*, and, in an appendix, an early skit by Austen entitled “The Visit: A Comedy in Two Acts.” Caines takes this occasion to counter a common belief that on the evidence of *Mansfield Park* and its use of Inchbald’s play Austen must have thought little of drama. Unpretentious but informed commentary by Caines—a thirty-five-page general introduction (part of whose purpose is to document contemporary attitudes toward women playwrights), individual introductions and explanatory notes for each play, a chronology and further reading—make this an unusually attractive teaching text. If my experience is at all representative, it has something to teach teachers as well.

In *When Flesh Becomes Word: An Anthology of Early Eighteenth-Century Libertine Literature*, Bradford K. Mudge reprints the three most notorious and influential “prepornographic” publications before John Cleland’s classic of pornography, *The Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure (Fanny Hill)* (1749). These precedent texts—*The School of Venus* (1680), *Venus in the Cloister* (1725), and *A Dialogue Between a Married Lady and a Maid* (1740)—are in fact not English works but translations from the French. With other scholars Mudge distinguishes pornography from “obscene,” “erotic,” and “bawdy” literature as a peculiarly modern form, and, if pornography entails “the graphic depiction of sexual acts intended to arouse the audience” (p. xxix), one might object that this end is intended—or at least achieved—as much by Cleland’s predecessors as it is by *Fanny Hill*.

But Mudge also reminds us that there are other ways of getting at the nature of pornography, among them Walter Kendrick’s insight that it “names a debate, not a thing; pornography, he argues, is a controversy about where to place the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate cultural artifacts, not an unchanging category of stylistically similar, generically consistent objects” (p. vii). It is in this spirit that Mudge also calls these texts “libertine,” a complex word in contemporary and critical use alike whose reference includes but goes beyond the realm of sex and which does indeed directly raise the question of boundaries. Besides these three translations from the French, *When Flesh Becomes Word* collects a number of pre-1749 publications whose diversity—poems, a medical treatise, Henry Fielding’s *The Female Husband*—exemplifies the generic range of discourse that addressed the issue of pornography without seeming to be clear instances of it. Included in Mudge’s anthology are thirty-four illustrations, many from the texts he reprints.
Among the many republication projects initiated in recent years by the publishing house of Pickering and Chatto, one of the most arresting is *Literature and Science, 1660–1834*, edited by Judith Hawley. The aim of this eight-volume series is to reprint facsimile excerpts from texts that exemplify the discourse between two bodies of knowledge that at the beginning of this period lacked both name and epistemological autonomy and by its end were entering into the familiar modern opposition of the “two cultures.” These texts are themselves “literature” only in the sense of having been written and read, and their subject matter is less “science” than *scientia* in the first stages of conceiving its distinctive difference from knowledge as such. Each of the eight volumes includes readings, approximating the chronology of the series, arranged under one of the following headings: “Science as Polite Culture,” “Sciences of Body and Mind,” “Earthly Powers,” “Flora,” “Fauna,” “Astronomy,” “Natural Philosophy,” and “Chemistry.” Although the readings vary a great deal, it may be fair to say they all evince a dialectic between the impulse to justify the emergent sciences in their peculiar but socially serviceable distinctness and to “popularize” them in a language (sometimes that of poetry and dialogue) that is increasingly detachable from the language of the sciences themselves. *Literature and Science, 1660–1834* therefore may be seen as something like a documentary history of what is perhaps the most consequential of all divisions of knowledge. Readers of this history will be uncommonly dependent on the volume editors, whose editorial mark is left not only on the selection of texts but also on the way each has been excerpted to fit into the telling of a particular sort of story. But the guidance of readers is not confined to these implicit signs; introductions accompany each volume and each of the readings within each volume. Like other Pickering and Chatto enterprises, *Literature and Science* is priced for library rather than individual purchase. Unlike many of them, this series has a special pedagogic purpose that goes well beyond (the estimable one of) providing primary texts for relatively modest library collections that lack them.

**ENCYCLOPEDIA**

The *Alexander Pope Encyclopedia* is an unusual if not an unprecedented undertaking (its author, Pat Rogers, has already compiled a *Samuel Johnson Encyclopedia*). Rogers writes that the aim of the *Encyclopedia* is “to bring together in a single volume all the most material facts about Alexander Pope. It covers his life,
his writings in prose and verse, his correspondence, his friends and enemies, his main themes and concerns, and his literary techniques.” What it doesn’t supply is “long, discursive treatment of general issues such as Pope’s place in the landscape gardening movement or his attitude toward women” (p. xxiii). This is a bit misleading since in fact the Encyclopedia does contain what seem to me generous (but perhaps not “long”) entries for both “gardening” and “women”; in any case both topics also receive local treatment in other entries (e.g., “garden, Pope’s,” “grotto”; “Eliza Haywood,” “Martha Blount”). Greenwood has brought out the Encyclopedia in an oversize format with a hard cover that has the sturdy feel and look of a textbook.

The coverage Rogers achieves is remarkable. The approximately 750 entries listed in the Encyclopedia cover over 300 individuals Pope knew or wrote about, over sixty important Pope scholars and critics, scores of Popeian place names, some general topics (e.g., “religion,” “theater,” “portraits,” “maids of honor,” “French influences,” “will”), some literary terms (e.g., “imitation,” “georgic,” “zeugma,” “heroic couplet,” “wit”), words semantically charged by Pope’s usage (e.g., “dulness,” “Japhet,” “ombre,” “Timon’s villa,” “sylphs”), not to mention most of Pope’s poetry and prose. Indeed, the entries for his major poems are broken down into a series of subheadings so informative and detailed as to remind one of (the Platonic idea of) a crib sheet for students who’d prefer not to read the poem itself. Thus the entry for “The Dunciad” covers several pages and is divided into “composition,” “publication history,” “literary sources and models,” “analysis of the narrative,” “targets of the satire,” “contemporary response,” and “critical history.” Not only this sort of textual entry but also those for most of the topics include at their end a short reading list. And the entire alphabetical corpus is knit together by a network of boldface cross-references that tempt the practical user of reference works, who brings to the Encyclopedia a firm resolve to search for a specific term, to sink into the pleasant activity of leafing back and forth through it for an hour or so. Framing the Encyclopedia at its opening is a list of entries and a chronology of events in Pope’s life, and at its end a bibliography of secondary works (editions, collections, scholarship, criticism) and a comprehensive index to the whole. Some of the page numbers for bibliography entries run on too long unrelieved by subdivisions. But this is about all I can think of to criticize in the Alexander Pope Encyclopedia, clearly a labor of love by a scholar who has done as much as anyone currently writing to make the authors of the eighteenth century as conveniently and authoritatively available to us as possible.